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1. INTRODUCTION
In a state faced with more demands on funds than funds available, legal
representation for indigent defendants and sentenced criminals may not be
an attractive candidate for increased public funding.' The least attractive
proposal-to anyone except a prisoner-would probably be to increase free
legal services for those who want to get out of prison by attacking the validity
of their trial, guilty plea, or sentence. Legal representation for indigents
engaging in such collateral attacks is addressed in Missouri Supreme Court
Rule 27.26.
Rule 27.26 establishes the Missouri procedure for exercising the writ
of habeas corpus, 2 a right granted by the United States and Missouri
1. Burton Shostak, former head of the Public Defender Commission, calls
the public defender and appointed counsel program "unpopular." Hearings before
the Joint Public Defender Committee of the Missouri Senate and Missouri House 3 (Kansas
City, Mo. Sept. 23, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
2. "This Rule does not suspend the rights available by habeas corpus but
rather prescribes the procedure to be followed in seeking the enforcement of those
rights." MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(a). See also Wiglesworth v. Wyrick, 531 S.W.2d 713,
716-21 (Mo. En Banc 1976)(Rule 27.26 not a suspension of habeas corpus). For
a brief history of the writ of habeas corpus, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-411
(1963).
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Constitutions.' The problem is making the writ available to those persons
deprived of liberty in violation of due process without inviting abuse by
frivolous claims.4
In 1978, the Missouri Supreme Court ordered that every indigent
prisoner who files a Rule 27.26 motion must have the aid of an attorney.5
Named for the case from which it arose, this requirement is known as the
Fields amendment to Rule 27.26. But in the new public defender law6 signed
by Governor Bond on March 11, 1982, the legislature does not mention ap-
pointing or paying counsel. Nor does it appear that the legislature intended
that public defenders represent Rule 27.26 movants. 7 The result is an ap-
parent conflict between the Fields amendment, which mandates immediate
appointment of counsel in Rule 27.26 cases, and the new legislation, which
does not provide for state-paid representation. This conflict could be cor-
rected by a minor amendment to the new public defender legislation, which
this Comment recommends.
This Comment is divided into three parts: first, a brief history of Rule
27.26, along with its problems of expense and lack of finality; second, an
overview of the new public defender system, which provides a framework
for quality, cost-effective representation for indigent Rule 27.26 movants;
and third, proposals that would change the functioning of Rule 27.26 itself,
including ChiefJustice Donnelly's proposal to integrate direct appeals and
Rule 27.26 appeals into a unitary review procedure.
To avoid possible misunderstandings, the term "appointed counsel"
in this Comment refers to private attorneys appointed by courts to repre-
sent indigents. "State-paid attorneys" refers to private attorneys and public
defenders.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RULE 27.26
Rule 27.26 is designed "to provide all relief heretofore available in any
court by habeas corpus, when used for the purpose of vacating, setting aside
or correcting a sentence."" Prior to 1953, Missouri had no Rule 27.26,
though the writ of habeas corpus was available. One problem with the writ
was that "by its very nature [it] was little understood by those people most
likely to utilize it, i.e., the person [sic] in confinement." 9 In 1953, the
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
4. A related but less recognized problem is that deserving Rule 27.26 movants
will go unrecognized-that the wheat will get lost in all the chaff-asjudges become
jaded from hearing too many meritless motions. Telephone interview with Boone
County Circuit Judge Frank Conley (Oct. 27, 1981).
5. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(h). This change was mandated in Fields v. State,
572 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
6. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 600.010-.900 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
7. See Part V.B. infra.
8. Wiglesworth v. Wyrick, 531 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
9. Pelofsky & Purdon, Rule 27.26: A Study in Post-Conviction Remedies, 39
UMKC L. REV. 1, 3 (1970).
[Vol. 47788
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Missouri Supreme Court adopted a one-paragraph Rule 27.26;10 the signifi-
cant change it made was that the proper court to petition for postconvic-
tion relief became the sentencing court, not the court in the jurisdiction where
the prisoner was confined as under habeas corpus. I Since the rule contained
no form that a prisoner could use to aid in drafting his motion, 1 2 it is ques-
tionable how much more comprehensible Rule 27.26 was to prisoners than
was the old writ.13 There was no right to counsel in the original Rule 27.26-.14
The next significant development occurred outside Missouri, in a 1963
trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases on postconviction relief.1 5 The
Court emphasized that, in the absence of appropriate state proceedings, there
was a need for federal habeas corpus review to prevent deprivations of liberty
without due process: "If the States withhold effective remedy, the federal
courts have the power and duty to provide it."16 In the wake of the Court's
decisions, state courts had to choose between revising inadequate postcon-
viction procedures or suffering federal courts to provide more frequent
postconviction remedies for state prisoners.
In 1967, the Missouri Supreme Court responded with a vastly expanded
Rule 27.26 that would "provide a post-conviction procedure in accord with
the principles in the so-called trilogy."1 7 Among the new provisions was one
titled "Right to Counsel," which stated, "If a motion presents questions
10. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26 (1959).
11. Pelofsky & Purdon, supra note 9, at 3.
12. The present rule has a form attached as an appendix. A Rule 27.26 mo-
tion "must be substantially in compliance" with that form. MO. SUP. CT. R.
27.26(c).
13. The addition of the easy-to-understand form has not met universal ac-
claim: "A passerby might think that monsters are only made in movies or on televi-
sion. Prior to September 1, 1967, Missourijurisprudents were safe in so assuming
.... Then the megaton-proportioned judicial bomb exploded when Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 27.26 opened the floodgates to postconviction proceedings
and even included a 'how-to-do-it manual' for inmates." Bishop, Guilty Pleas in
Missouri, 42 UMKC L. REV. 304, 304 (1974).
14. In 1953, even the right to counsel for indigents in felony trials was still
ten years away. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
16. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963). In Townsend v. Sain, the Court
said that a federal court must grant a hearing if:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as
a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial
allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not ade-
quately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it ap-
pears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full
and fair fact hearing.
372 U.S. at 313.
17. State v. Stidham, 415 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
1982] 789
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of law or issues of fact, the court shall appoint counsel immediately to assist
the prisoner if he is an indigent person .... "I But Missouri appellate courts
were inconsistent in applying the conditional phrase, "[i]f a motion presents
questions of law or issues of fact." 19 Under the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision in Smith v. State,20 counsel was to be appointed only if the movant
filing a pro se Rule 27.26 motion had pleaded facts, not just conclusions,
that would warrant relief if proved true. Most Rule 27.26 motions were filed
pro se, and this resulted in motions that often were "inarticulate and inart-
ful expressions of frustration." 21 Appeals from the resulting summary denial
of these motions were, and still are, by right. The state paid the costs and
provided counsel. 22 This meant that indigents who were denied counsel in
preparing their original motions automatically received counsel when they
appealed their denials. The results of Smith were "delay and confusion...
and an excessive number of appeals . . .from summary denials of pro se
motions to vacate sentence or judgment without the appointment of
counsel.' '23
The Missouri Supreme Court, hoping to improve the quality of peti-
tions filed and decrease the burgeoning number of appeals from dismissals
of these petitions without a hearing, overruled Smith in Fields v. State.24 The
court announced its intention to abandon the case-by-case approach in favor
of a per se rule on appointment of counsel for indigents. 25 The resulting
amendment to Rule 27.26 became effective December 14, 1978. It provides:
"When an indigent files a pro se motion, the court shall immediately ap-
point counsel to represent the prisoner.' '26 This amendment expressed the
court's belief that" [t]he proper agent to assist the court in the search to deter-
mine whether a claimed ground for relief is meritorious and deserving of
relief or not meritorious or perhaps even frivolous is an attorney. "27
Originally, Missouri lawyers bore the burden of serving as appointed
counsel for indigent Rule 27.26 movants without pay. Then, in 1971, the
Missouri Supreme Court stated that it would no longer "compel the attorneys
of Missouri to discharge alone a duty which constitutionally is the burden
18. MO. SuP. CT. R. 27.26(h) (1969).
19. See Fields v. State, 572 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
20. 513 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Mo. En Banc 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1975).
21. Fields, 572 S.W.2d at 481-82. Seealso Popper, Recent Developments in Missouri:
Criminal Law (The Sixth Amendment), 48 UMKC L. REV. 601, 608-09 (1980).
22. Fields, 572 S.W.2d at 481 (citing MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(j), (k), (1). Ap-
pellate review should be "as of right" for applicants or respondents in postconvic-
tion litigation, according to the American Bar Association Standards approved
August 9, 1978. IV ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Postconviction
Remedies § 22-5.1(b) (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
23. Fields, 572 S.W.2d at 480.
24. 572 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
25. Id. at 483. See also Popper, supra note 21, at 608-09.
26. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(h).
27. Fields, 572 S.W.2d at 482.
[Vol. 47
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of the state." ,28 The legislature established the public defender system the
next year, with legislation granting reimbursement for "actual expenses"
and a "reasonable fee.' '29 In 1974, the Missouri Supreme Court set the fee
schedule under which these lawyers worked at $15.00 an hour for out-of-
court time and $20.00 an hour for in-court time.3 0 In many cases this did
not even cover the lawyer's overhead. 31 What funds there were sometimes
ran out, and lawyers had to wait to be paid from the appropriations for the
following year. 32
28. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. En Banc 1971).
29. Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.065.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (repealed 1982).
30. Office of State Courts Administrator, Missouri's Public Defender and Ap-
pointed Counsel Program: Annual Statistical Report 13 (1978-1979) [hereinafter
cited as Annual Statistical Report].
31. See Popper, Forced Labor Without Apology, 37J. MO. B. 446,446 (1981). A
Texas lawyer did analyze his court-appointed salary ($20.55 per hour) and his
overhead ($31 per hour) in Perini, Doqending the Poor: Who Pays the Price?, 16 DOCKET
CALL 3 (1982).
32. After the state funds appropriated for fiscal 1981 to pay appointed counsel
were depleted, a lawyer appointed to defend an accused in a criminal case challenged
the court order that he do so without pay. State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W. 2d
64 (Mo. En Banc 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1000 (1982). The Missouri Supreme
Court lamented, "The cupboard is bare." Citing the constitutional prohibition
that, "[n]o money shall be withdrawn from the state treasury except by warrant
in accordance with an appropriation made by law," MO. CONST. art. IV, § 28,
the court asked, "What are we to do?" The court concluded that it must turn to
the Missouri Bar for assistance and added, "We do so without apology." Id. at
65. For a critical response to the court's position, see Popper, supra note 31. The
court did offer emergency guidelines, however, including a provision that nonpay-
ment for 120 days for prior appointed counsel services could constitute grounds for
excusing a lawyer from additional appointment. The court also said that defendants
might have to be discharged if no funds were provided to pay a lawyer for the expense
involved in building a defense case, for lawyers could not be required to advance
their personal funds for such expenses. 617 S.W.2d at 67. See also Williamson v.
Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1216 (8th Cir. 1982)(habeas corpus granted on due pro-
cess grounds to Missouri attorney jailed for contempt for refusal to serve as ap-
pointed counsel and pay $500 in necessary criminal defense expenses).
The lawyer in Wo/ffsubsequently explained his position in terms of fairness, say-
ing he didn't think it fair that a licensed attorney had to do pro bono work when
other licensed persons did not:
Doctors have licenses. They're not required to do anything for the poor,
not even in the criminal cases .... I have a case right now, in which I
represent a very poor person. I need an expert to come into court to testify.
That doctor won't even come to court. He's only going to testify for about
twenty minutes. Won't come to court unless I give him $500.00 .... I
can't say to him, "Hey, I'm working for nothing. I need you to work for
nothing, or your license is going to be in danger like mine. You may go
to jail, like I may go to jail.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 53 (St. Louis, Mo. Oct. 7, 1981) (testimony of Donald
Wolff). The reaction to the court's conscription of attorneys was strong among some
5
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In 1981, the court reiterated the importance of appointed counsel under
the Fields amendment: "It was and is believed that the amendment to Rule
27.26(h) would contribute substantially to an expeditious, less expensive,
and more final resolution of postconviction constitutional issues and make
effective the prohibition of Rule 27.26(d) against successive motions ....
The amendment has been effective for these purposes."
33
III. THE COSTS OF POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
A. Expenses Under the Fields Amendment
The state, in times of financial stress, is concerned about expense. Has
the Fields amendment cut down on Rule 27.26 expense? A simple observa-
tion on the practical effect of the amendment is that it increases the number
of attorneys representing Rule 27.26 movants.3 4 The greater the number
of appointed qttorneys, the greater the expense. But the answer is not that
simple. As one public defender said, "It may first appear that the Fields deci-
sion has resulted in more work for the bar. However, the actual effect should
be to bring the true issues before the court at the earliest instance." 35 The
American Bar Association in its Standards for Criminal Justice is more blunt:
"It is a waste of judicial resources and an inefficient method of treating the
substantive merits of applications for postconviction relief to proceed without
counsel for applicants.' '36
Unfortunately, Missouri has not kept separate records on the number
of attorneys appointed to represent persons at trial and how many were
appointed to aid prisoners seeking postconviction relief. All payments to ap-
pointed counsel have come from the same fund, no matter what the purpose
of appointment.3 7 Still, a look at the total increase in demand for appointed
counsel in general is perhaps valuable. Since the hourly rate paid to appointed
attorneys has remained constant since 1974,38 the increase in cost per year
members of the Missouri Bar. An advertisement by an organization of criminal
lawyers trumpeted, "LAWYER ORDERED TO JAIL FOR REFUSING TO
TAKE COURT-APPOINTED CASE," and called on lawyers to "help us fight
this injustice." 37J. MO. B. 520 (1981); 38J. MO. B. 197 (1982). The 1982 adver-
tisement ran subsequent to the effective date of the new public defender legislation
which eliminated any mention of court-appointed counsel. Courts would seem to
retain the inherent power to appoint counsel, however. See note 171 and accompa-
nying text infra.
33. State ex rel. Smith v. Tillman, 623 S.W.2d 242, 245-46 (Mo. En Banc 1981)
(footnote omitted).
34. Wolff& Lemp, A New Testfor Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 36J. MO. B.
92 (1980).
35. Daley, A Guidefor Appointed Counselfor Indigent Movants Under Rule 27.26,
37 J. MO. B. 41 (1981).
36. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 22-4.3 Commentary.
37. See MO. REV. STAT. § 600.150 (1978) (repealed 1982) (reimbursement of
expenses and compensation for appointed attorneys).
38. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 47
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of appointed counsel represents an increase in attorney time.3 9 The Office
of State Courts Administrator reports that appointed counsel fees rose from
a little over $400,000 in fiscal 1976 to over $1,100,000 in fiscal 1980.40 The
State Auditor shows appointed counsel fees for 1981 at over $1,380,000.41
For fiscal 1982, more than $1,380,000 was appropriated for appointed
counsel, not including an additional request for over $440,000 to pay ex-
penses for appointed counsel accrued in 1981.42
Using 1982 funds to pay 1981 bills was not a solution; it was merely
"robbing Peter to pay Paul. " In effect, 1982 appointed counsel funds started
off $444,000 behind. 43 Between 1978 and 1981, demand for earned appointed
39. Increase in attorney time can be attained by more cases, more time spent
per case, or a combination of both. Figures for appointed counsel per case fluctuated
but generally went up:






Annual Statistical Report, supra note 30, at 7-8 (1979-1980). The increase in cost
per case, however, is insufficient to explain the overall rise in appointed counsel
costs. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text infra.
40. Here is the annual breakdown:






Annual Statistical Report, supra note 30, at 7 (1979-1980).
41. State Auditor of Missouri, Report 81-115, Public Defender
Commission-Two Years EndedJune 30, 1980, at 7 (Sept. 21, 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Auditor's Report]. The figures, it should be noted, vary slightly between
governmental agencies and *ometimes even within a single agency.
42. At the close of fiscal 1981, appointed counsel bills totaling $444,458 re-
mained unpaid. When the state legislature appropriated money to the Public
Defender Commission for fiscal 1982, it sent an accompanying letter of intent which
authorized the paying of those bills. Judicial Dep't Budget, Fiscal Year 1982-83,
at 271. According to that budget, the $444,458 is in addition to an original ap-
propriation for appointed counsel of $1,381,657. Id. at 269.
43. See id. at 271. As a "temporary emergency rule," the Public Defender
Commission, using the power first granted it under Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.165
(1978) (repealed 1982), issued Administrative Rule 10 onJuly 9, 1981. Stating that
appropriations to the public defender system for fiscal year 1981-1982 might be in-
sufficient to cover appointed counsel costs, the Commission set a schedule of max-
imum fees allowable for appointed counsel in misdemeanor, juvenile, and criminal
cases. Maximum fees for Rule 27.26 cases were not mentioned. See MoBar Bull.
Aug. 1981, at 1.
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counsel fees and expenses outstripped legislative appropriations every year,
and on two occasions the state legislature responded with emergency
appropriations. 44 The federal government did not pick up the slack. 45
In short, total cost of appointed counsel more than tripled in the five-
year period between fiscal 1976 and fiscal 1981. Because of the lack of separate
recordkeeping, it would be difficult to determine exactly what percentage
of the cost was attributable to counsel in Rule 27.26 cases. For fiscal 1981,
however, $42,131.32 in 1982 funds was spent on appointed counsel in 121
Rule 27.26 cases. 46 An additional $34,690.66 in 1982 funds was spent on
44. Auditor's Report, supra note 41, at 22. In each of those years, the Public
Defender Commission requested emergency appropriations with these results:





Id. Shortfalls in both the budget requests and appropriations for the appointed
counsel program can be seen in the following figures:
Fiscal Initial Initial Expenditures
Year Budget Request Appropriation Incurred
1978 $735,000 $511,255 $844,313
1979 $776,000 $776,000 $875,084
1980 $955,280 $936,558 $1,106,944
1981 $936,558 $1,129,954 $1,387,557
1982 $1,450,000 $1,381,657
Id. Appropriations from the State General Revenue Fund to the public defender
system also were insufficient to meet demands in fiscal 1979 and 1980. Expenses
of $214,381 for fiscal 1979 were paid from appropriations for fiscal 1980, and ex-
penses of $194,130 for fiscal 1980 were paid from appropriations for fiscal 1981.
Id, at 12. Of the excess obligations for 1979, $209,165 were for the appointed counsel
program and $5,216 were for public defender offices. For 1980, $186,657 in ex-
cess obligations were for appointed counsel, $7,473 for public defenders. Id. at 21.
45. For fiscal 1977-78, federal resources for Missouri's public defender and
appointed counsel program totaled $29,382.03. Kansas City received $23,235.65
of those funds, and St. Louis received $6,146.38. Annual Statistical Report, supra
note 30, at 1 (1977-1978). For fiscal year 1978-79, federal funding amounted to
$66,343.31, or roughly 31% of Missouri's expenditures on the public defender and
appointed counsel program for that year. Jackson County received $35,196.39, and
St. Louis County and the city of St. Louis received $11,661.79 and $19,485.13
respectively. Id. at 7-8 (1978-1979). The Office of State Courts Administrator makes
no mention of any federal funding for fiscal year 1979-80. Id. (1979-1980).
46. Missouri Supreme Court, Financial Accounting System Accounts Payable
Disbursement Register (July 1, 1980-Aug. 31, 1981). None of the payment due
dates for Rule 27.26 appointed counsel in the report was later than the end of fiscal
1981. Though the records for all appointed counsel were contained in one report,
each individual billing contained a description; Rule 27.26 cases were denoted as
such, and thus the figures for Rule 27.26 cases were separable. Where two separate
fee listings were made under the same document number, they were counted as
two separate cases.
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1981 appointed counsel bills for 76 postconviction cases. 47 Thus, the 1981
total for appointed counsel in Rule 27.26 cases was $76,821.98. When the
cost is divided by the number of cases it represents, the price tag for legal
fees in each Rule 27.26 case was approximately $390.00.
Attorneys' fees are only a portion of the costs involved in Rule 27.26
motions. When a hearing on a motion is held, there are also the costs of
transporting the prisoner to and from the circuit court in which the case
originally was heard, 48 subpoena costs, 49 court clerk fees, 50 and often the
cost of keeping a sheriff's deputy in the courtroom.51 In appeals, there are
transcript costs.5 2 In every case, there are the costs of the prosecutor's time
in opposing the motion,5 3 the judge's time, and general courtroom
overhead.54
47. This figure was obtained by searching files in the Office of State Courts
Administrator, 1105 R. Southwest, Jefferson City, Missouri.
48. Transportation costs, paid by the county in which the hearing is held, are
now 20¢ per mile. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 57.280,222.120 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
49. Subpoena costs, paid to the sheriff by the county, are 20¢ per mile for each
mile traveled in serving the subpoena in excess of five miles from the courthouse
and $2.50 for summoning a witness or for return of non est on a subpoena. Id. §
57.280.
50. Court clerk costs are $25.00 for every civil case instituted. Id. § 483.530.10.
Rule 27.26 proceedings are civil in nature. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(a).
51. The sheriff or his deputy receives $10.00 per day in court. MO. REV.
STAT. § 57.280 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
52. Transcripts cost 70¢ per page and 20¢ per copy of a page. Id. 5 485.100
(1978). Rule 27.26(k) mandates the furnishing of transcripts for indigents on ap-
peal. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(k). In federal habeas corpus cases, fees for transcripts
are paid from federal funds. 28 U.S.C. § 753 (1976). Where appellate or postcon-
viction procedures are afforded prisoners, a state must provide its indigents with
the necessary transcripts. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
53. If the prosecutor and his assistant have a disqualifying interest in a case,
a special prosecutor must be appointed. Mo. REV. STAT. § 56.110 (1978). Instead
of the $15.00 out-of-court and $20.00 in-court hourly fee set for appointed counsel,
however, the special prosecutor is entitled to "a reasonable fee" fixed by the court.
Id. § 56.130. "Reasonable fee" can be translated as a lawyer's regular fee. See, e.g.,
Grady v. State, No. CV180-1590CC (Boone County Mo. Cir. Ct. Feb. 6, 1981)
(7 hours at $50.00 per hour).
Appeals of decisions in Rule 27.26 cases are handled for the state by the Office
of the Attorney General. The Attorney General has a small office in Kansas City
which handles appearances at appeals in the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District, but if appearances must be made in the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals for the Southern or Eastern Districts, expenses per trip average roughly $100.
Interview with Kristie Green, Chief Counsel, Criminal Division, Missouri Attorney
General's Office, in Jefferson City, Missouri (Aug. 24, 1981).
54. Because Rule 27.26 motions represent a small proportion of the total
caseload in Missouri's circuit courts, however, the cost ofjudges' time and general
courtroom overhead for Rule 27.26 motions is relatively small. In fiscal 1978, a
total of 490,000 cases were filed in Missouri circuit courts, with 456,000 disposi-
tions. Missouri Executive Budget § 6-6 (1980). In fiscal 1979, 600,000 cases were
19821 RULE 27.26 795
9
Scott: Scott: Postconviction Remedies under Missouri Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Even with appointed counsel fees currently running at $390.00 per Rule
27.26 case, the Fields amendment actually could be reducing expenses if the
number of Rule 27.26 cases being filed and heard or being appealed has been
reduced. The figures, however, show that the number, and hence the cost,
of dispositions and hearings in the circuit courts of Rule 27.26 cases has in-
creased slightly since Fields. Available statistics for the three years prior to
Fields show an average of 329 dispositions of Rule 27.26 cases in circuit courts
per year with an average of 157 hearings. The two years following Fields show
an average of 336 dispositions with an average of 170 hearings per year.
55
But another variable must be considered. The number of inmates in the
state penitentiary and other state correctional institutions also has increased
since Fields. More inmates mean more Rule 27.26 petitions. In the five-year
period from 1975 to 1980, the Missouri prison population increased by over
1,500 inmates; the population stabilized between 1980 and 1981.56 This was
filed in circuit courts, with 545,000 dispositions. Id. § 6-8 (1981). The 439 filings
of Rule 27.26 cases in circuit courts in fiscal 1979 thus constituted only .073 % of
the total filings during that year, and the 279 dispositions were a mere .05 % of total
dispositions.
55. The figures for available years are shown on the following table:
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26 Cases,
Missouri Circuit Courts
Fiscal With Without
Year Filings Dispositions Hearing Hearing
1974 * 290 150 140
1975 * 291 140 151
1976 * 406 181 225
1977 * * *
1978 * * * *
1979 439 279 109 170
1980 512 392 231 161
*Data not available.
Letter from Linda McGinnis, Planning and Statistics Analyst, Office of State Courts
Administrator (Aug. 24, 1981).
56. The average daily prison population in Missouri has grown steadily, as
the following table indicates:







MISSOURI DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, BIENNIAL REPORT, Introduction
(1979-1980). In 1981, the prison population was approximately 5423. Missouri Ex-
ecutive Budget §§ 9-77, 9-80 to 9-88 (1982). Figures for the Ozark Correctional
Center were derived by multiplying the number of correction officers by the
correction-officer ratio. Id. § 9-83.
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nearly a forty percent increase in prisoners. In light of this increase, it can
be argued that the increase in Rule 27.26 filings in circuit court would have
been greater but for the reduction of successive motions caused by Fields.
B. Appellate Costs of Rule 27.26
While the increase in the number of filings of Rule 27.26 motions has
not been great,5 7 the increase in the number of appeals is striking. In 1975,
there were 86 Missouri appellate decisions handed down in Rule 27.26 cases;
in 1976, the number was 95; and in 1977, it reached 100. In 1978, the year
the Fields amendment went into effect in mid-December,5 8 117 appellate deci-
sions were rendered. In 1979, the number jumped to 137. In 1980, the
number of appellate decisions was 137; and in 1981, it climbed to 173.-9 In
this six-year period, which saw a forty percent increase in prisoners, 60 there
was a morethan one hundred percent increase in the number of Rule 27.26
appellate decisions. In the years following Fields, there was a two percent
increase in prisoners and a twenty-six percent increase in the number of ap-
pellate decisions. The number of appeals increased much more rapidly than
the size of the prison population.
The vast bulk of Rule 27.26 appeals are now heard by the Missouri courts
of appeals instead of the Missouri Supreme Court. 6 1 While the ratio of
dispositions of Rule 27.26 cases compared to total case dispositions in
Missouri circuit courts remains low-one-twentieth of one percent in
1979 62 -the ratio jumps dramatically in the courts of appeals. In 1978, Rule
57. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
58. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(h).
59. The Lexis© computer system was used in gathering these figures. There
is room for error in these statistics, but the figures are, at the least, fairly represen-
tative. Figures for 1977 and 1981 include two writ of prohibition cases that were
consolidated with Rule 27.26 appeals. State ex rel. Smith v. Tillman, 623 S.W.2d
242 (Mo. En Banc 1981); State ex rel. Reece v. Campbell, 551 S.W.2d 292 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1977). Figures for 1980 do not include a writ of prohibition case merely
filed in regard to a Rule 27.26 motion. State ex rel. Carver v. Whipple, 608 S.W.2d
410 (Mo. En Banc 1980). Figures for 1979, 1978, and 1976 do not include three
aborted Rule 27.26 cases. State v. Lumsden, 589 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. En Banc 1979);
Plant v. Haynes, 568 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978); Wiglesworth v. Wyrick,
531 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. En Banc 1976). Figures for 1975 do include a putative cor-
am nobis case which was held to be a Rule 27.26 case and treated accordingly.
Blackwell v. State, 520 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975).
60. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
61. The number of cases heard by the Missouri Supreme Court is quite
small-10 in 1978, 7 in 1979, 4 in 1980, and 5 in 1981. In the early years under
amended Rule 27.26, 1967 through 1972, the Missouri Supreme Court was averag-
ing 60 opinions a year in Rule 27.26 appeals. But under an amendment to MO.
CONST. art. V, § 3, effective in 1972, courts of appeals now havejurisdiction in Rule
27.26 appeals unless the cases involve constitutional construction or a capital crime.
See Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri-Five Years UnderAmended Rule 27. 26,
38 Mo. L. REv. 2-3 (1973).
62. See note 55 supra.
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27.26 cases accounted for 10.7 percent (107 of 1002) of all opinions issued
by the courts of appeals. 63 In 1979, the figure rose to 12 percent (130 of
1082).64 In 1980, it dropped to 10.2 percent (133 of 1301), 65 but it climbed
to 11.2 percent (168 of 1498) in 1981.66 In short, an average of eleven per-
cent of Missouri court of appeals cases from 1978 through 1980 were Rule
27.26 cases.
Appellants in Rule 27.26 cases generally have not fared well. 67 An ex-
ception is Rule 27.26 movants who had been given an additional sentence
of three years for the crime of armed criminal action. Sentences that were
not reduced by the circuit courts were routinely reduced by three years in
accord with the holding in Sours v. State" that the additional three-year penalty
63. Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, 317 opinigns. Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, 489 opinions. Missouri Cou'rt of Appeals
for the Southern District, 196 opinions. Missouri Executive Budget §§ 6-10, 6-11,
6-12 (1980).
64. Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, 415 opinions. Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, 500 opinions. Missouri Court ofAppeals
for the Southern District, 167 opinions. Id. §§ 6-5, 6-6, 6-7 (1981).
65. Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, 461 opinions. Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, 520 opinions. Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Southern District, 320 opinions. Id. §§ 6-9, 6-10, 6-11 (1982).
66. Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, 440 opinions. Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, 622 opinions. Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Southern District, 436 opinions. Id. §§ 6-13, 6-14, 6-15 (1983).
67. A "clearly erroneous" standard of review is used in Rule 27.26 cases. MO.
SUP. CT. R. 27.260). For success rates in the early years of amended Rule 27.26,
see Anderson, supra note 65, at 2-4.
68. 593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. En Banc), vacated, 446 U.S. 962, on remand, 603
S.W.2d 592 (Mo. En Banc 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981). Appeals in-
volving the Sours case explain, in part, the jump in the number of Rule 27.26 appeals
cases from the years 1979 and 1980 to 1981. In 1981, 14 out of 16 such appeals were
brought by the state, which lost in its attempts to overturn three-year reductions
in sentences for armed criminal action. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 629 S.W.2d
421 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); Burse v. State, 626 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. App., E.D.
1981); Triplett v. State, 624 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981). Two successful
Sours-type appeals were brought by appellant-movants. Dunn v. State, 624 S.W.2d
102 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981); Brown v. State, 619 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. En Banc 1981).
In 1980, there were four reported Sours-type cases, all brought by appellant-movants
and all successful. Davis v. State, 611 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Vaughn
v. State, 610 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Bullock v. State, 608 S.W.2d
480 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Lacy v. State, 607 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
In addition, there was a successful double jeopardy case involving drug violations
which relied on Sours. Parker v. State, 608 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980)
(vacating a five-year concurrent sentence, upholding other sentences).
Movants seeking new trials subsequent to Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)
and Lee v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 461 (1979), on the ground that their jury panels
failed to have the requisite cross-section of the population due to a lack of women,
failed. In 1981, there were twelve such unsuccessful cases reported, further help-
ing to explain the jump in Rule 27.26 appeals for that year. See, e.g., Sivils v. State,
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for armed criminal action violated the double jeopardy prohibition of the
Missouri Constitution. Double jeopardy cases aside, relief was granted to
only five Rule 27.26 appellants in 1981. Appellate courts granted eviden-
tiary hearings to two of the five 69 and required appbintment of counsel for
another. 70 In the other two cases, the only relief was a directive to the lower
court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.7 ' The state had one
case overturned in its favor. 72
In 1980, relief was granted to seven movants. One was permitted to refile
his Rule 27.26 motion because of clerical error and procedural muddle in
the trial. 73 In three cases, the lower courts were directed to make a change
of judge, 74 and in one a movant was granted a hearing on the question of
the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction in his criminal proceeding. 75 One
case was remanded for further evidence on whether Rule 27.26 was the
proper remedy, 76 and another was remanded for findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. 77 Again, the state had one case overturned.78
627 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981); Taylor v. State, 624 S.W.2d 170 (Mo.
App., W.D. 1981); Larrabee v. State, 616 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
In 1980, there were six of these unsuccessful cases. See, e.g., Champion v. State,
605 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980); Stamps v. State, 603 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1980). Missouri courts repeatedly rejected Duren claims on the ground
that failure to make a timely objection at trial bars review in either direct appeals
or Rule 27.26 cases. See, e.g., Benson v. State, 611 S.W.2d 538, 541-42 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1980). Likewise, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were rejected for
failure to timely object. See, e.g., id. at 542-45.
69. Quillun v. State, 626 S.W.2d 414, 415-16 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (record
did not conclusively show counsel was effective); Flowers v. State, 618 S.W.2d 655,
657 (Mo. En Banc 1981) (issue whether counsel abandoned movant on Rule 27.26
appeal).
70. Johnson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981) (Fields not
followed).
71. Gaines v. State, 620 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); Brauch
v. State, 611 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981). MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(i)
states, "The court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues
presented, whether or not a hearing is held."
72. Rogers v. State, 625 S.W.2d 184, 185 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981) (second
degree murder lesser included offense when charged with first degree murder).
73. Brame v. State, 597 S.W.2d 665, 668, 672-73 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980)
(circuit court directed to "proceed anew").
74. Yeager v. State, 602 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Davis v.
State, 598 S.W.2d 582, 584-86 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980); Moore v. State, 594
S.W.2d 355, 356 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
75. Russell v. State, 597 S.W.2d 694, 696, 698 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980) (mov-
ant not brought to trial within 180 days in accordance with MO. REV. STAT. §
222.100 (1978)).
76. Dixon v. State, 594 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
77. Cams v. State, 598 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980).
78. Abell v. State, 606 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980) (ruling reduc-
ing 50-year sentence for marijuana sale to ten-year sentence reversed).
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Relief was granted to eleven Rule 27.26 movants in 1979, and some of
the relief was significant. A new trial was granted in a case where the mov-
ant was denied assistance of counsel to file his motion for a new trial. 79 A
finding that no conflict of interest existed for the attorney of a movant who
pleaded guilty was held clearly erroneous, reversed, and remanded.
8 0
Another judgment was vacated where a movant had been convicted on one
charge and sentenced on another."' As for other relief, ajudge was directed
to disqualify himself in one case; 82 evidentiary hearings were specifically
ordered in four cases; 83 and more specific findings of fact and conclusions
of law were ordered in two cases.8 4 In one case, the judgment was reversed
and remanded for the trial court to determine, in its discretion, whether
sentences should run consecutively or concurrently. 85 In summary, excluding
double jeopardy cases, at least some degree of relief was granted to five ap-
pellants in 1981, seven in 1980, and eleven in 1979. No prisoners were
released from custody.
Statistics are not available for relief accorded to Rule 27.26 claimants
in circuit courts. It may be hoped, however, that the most egregious viola-
tions of due process would be recognized and the movants offered relief at
the circuit court level.
By far the most frequently used ground for relief in Rule 27.26 cases
is ineffective assistance of counsel. In 1979 and 1980, nearly fifty percent
of Rule 27.26 petitioners claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The
percentage fell to thirty-five percent in 1981.86
79. Morse v. State, 591 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (sentence
and judgment vacated, order to relieve trial counsel set aside, and movant given
permission to file motion for new trial).
80. LaFrance v. State, 585 S.W.2d 317, 323 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
81. Green v. State, 581 S.W.2d 478, 481-82 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979) (mov-
ant pleaded guilty to stealing motor vehicle, but sentenced for first-degree burglary).
82. Jackson v. State, 585 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
83. Chambers v. State, 592 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979) (ineffective
assistance of counsel); Andrews v. State, 581 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Mo. App., E.D.
1979) (whether movant who pleaded guilty understood sentences were consecutive);
DeClue v. State, 579 S.W.2d 158, 159-60 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (newly discovered
evidence); Richardson v. State, 577 S.W.2d 653, 654-55 (Mo. En Banc 1979)
(alleged violation of due process).
84. Fowler v. State, 588 S.W.2d 249, 249 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979); Wilson
v. State, 585 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979).
85. Baker v. State, 584 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
86. According to the Lexis© computer system, 47% (65 of 137) of the Rule
27.26 cases in both 1979 and 1980 involved ineffective assistance of counsel. For
1981, 35 % (61 of 174) of the cases cited by Lexis© involved ineffective assistance
of counsel. Involuntary plea of guilty was the most frequent ground for motions
in the early years of amended Rule 27.26. See Anderson, supra note 61, at 6.
It should be noted that Missouri courts do not recognize ineffective assistance
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of counsel in handling a direct appeal as a ground for Rule 27.26 motions. See, e.g.,
Fields v. State, 596 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980); Starrv. State, 564 S.W.2d
335 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978). The proper motion to make in such a case is a "mo-
tion to recall the mandate." Daley, supra note 35, at 42 (citing Hemphill v. State,
566 S.W.2d 200, 208 (Mo. En Banc 1978)). Nor do the courts recognize ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel in Rule 27.26 motions as a ground for appeal of Rule 27.26
denials:
Were a prisoner permitted to challenge the effectiveness of his legal counsel
at the first 27.26 hearing by means of filing a second 27.26, then he could
likewise challenge his representation at the second hearing by filing a third
27.26, and so on ad infinitum. That patent absurdity would intolerably
clutter the courts and would reduce the whole legal process to ridicule.
Williams v. State, 507 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974). See also McCor-
mick v. State, 502 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Mo. 1973); Duncan v. State, 524 S.W.2d 140,
142 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
Rule 27.26 appointed attorneys can be held liable for malpractice: "[D]efense
counsel who is appointed by the court.., has exactly the same duties and burdens
and responsibilities as the highly paid, paid-in-advance criminal defense lawyer."
Burger, Counsel for the Prosecution and Defense- Their Roles Under the Minimum Stan-
dards, 8 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 2, 6 (1969). On the related question of lack of immunity
against prosecution for malpractice in state court of an attorney appointed by a
federal judge for a federal trial, see Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 201 (1979).
The standard for effective assistance of trial counsel was reworked recently in
Seales v. State, 580 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. En Banc 1979). The "fair trial" standard
used in Missouri, the Missouri Supreme Court said, was "expressed differently"
than the standard used in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit. In order to ensure uniformity between state and federal courts, the Eighth Cir-
cuit standard was adopted prospectively. Id. at 736-37. It has two parts. First, "[t]he
accepted standard for effectiveness of trial counsel is now established as that degree
of performance which conforms to the care and skill of a reasonably competent
lawyer rendering similar services under the existing circumstances." Id. at 735
(quoting United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 844 (1977)). Second, the petitioner must show that his attorney's behavior
prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 735. See also McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207,
218 (8th Cir. 1974). Whether there is much difference between the old and new
standards is debatable. For a discussion of the new standard, see Popper, supra note
21, at 604-08; Wolff & Lemp, supra hote 34. The "fair trial" standard replaced the
older Missouri standard of "farce and ... mockery ofjustice, shocking to the con-
science of the Court." Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967). See Mo. BAR C.L.E., POST-CONVICTION
REMEDIES § 32.15 (1978).
Missouri Supreme Court Chief Justice Donnelly says that the United States
Supreme Court has not told the states what ineffective assistance of counsel is, even
though Powell v. Alabama, 283 U.S. 45 (1932), says that it must be prevented.
Interview with Missouri Supreme Court ChiefJustice Robert Donnelly, injeffer-
son City, Missouri (Aug. 12, 1981). The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District notes that "[wihatever the formulation of the standard, its application to
given fact situations will be difficult." Benson v. State, 611 S.W.2d 538, 544 (Mo.
App., W.D. 1980).
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IV. CONSIDERATIONS IN PROVIDING
POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
A. Finality: Federal Habeas Corpus Cases
Although Fields states that "[f]inality is a central aspect of Rule 27.26, ' ' a7
it is not necessarily achieved even after appeal of a Rule 27.26 case. As one
author says, "Perhaps the primary reason for appeal is the hope of obtain-
ing federal habeas corpus relief after the prisoner has exhausted his Missouri
post-conviction remedies, which include a 27.26 appeal." 8 Federal law re-
quires that a prisoner exhaust state remedies prior to pursuing federal habeas
corpus relief.8 9
Habeas corpus petitioners in Missouri federal district courts did not fare
well, either. In thirty-six of thirty-eight reported cases from 1978 to 1981,
relief was denied or the case was dismissed. 90 In sixteen of these cases, a failure
87. 572 S.W.2d at 483. The court also quoted a passage from one of the trilogy
of cases that precipitated the 1967 revision of Rule 27.26:
Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest
in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with
an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not on
whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner
can be restored to a useful place in the community. It is with this interest
in mind, as well as the desire to avoid confinements contrary to fundamen-
tal justice, that courts and legislatures have developed rules governing the
availability of collateral relief.
Id. at 481 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963)). The
Missouri Supreme Court added, "Our experience in Missouri is no exception.'"572
S.W.2d at 481.
88. Anderson, supra note 61, at 4 (footnote omitted).
89. The relevant federal statute provides:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State
corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such pro-
cess ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if
he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available pro-
cedure, the question presented.
28 U.S.C. 5 2254 (1976). The exhaustion of state remedies requirement "gives state
courts the opportunity to pass upon and correct errors of federal law in the state
prisoner's conviction." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 437-38 (1963).
90. As in their Missouri predecessors, the most frequent ground cited in federal
postconviction relief petitions was ineffective assistance of counsel. Grounds for peti-
tion listed in order of frequency are as follows: (1) Ineffective assistance of counsel:
Veneri v. Circuit Court, 528 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Dunn v. Wyrick, 528
F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Johnson v. Wyrick, 501 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Mo.
1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1013 (1981); Brown v. Wyrick, 496 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.
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to exhaust state remedies was cited as the reason for denial or dismissal. 9 1
The closely related principle of comity also was invoked to deny relief or
Mo. 1980); Frankoviglia v. Wyrick, 495 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Mo. 1980); McLallen
v. Wyrick, 494 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Agee v. Wyrick, 480 F. Supp. 24
(W.D. Mo. 1979); Cody v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, 468 F. Supp.
431 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Boothe v. Wyrick, 452 F. Supp. 1304 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
(2) Insufficiency of evidence: Simpson v. Wyrick, 527 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Mo.
1981); Moore v. Wyrick, 510 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Cole v. Wyrick,
505 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Greenhaw v. Wyrick, 472 F. Supp. 730 (W.D.
Mo. 1979); Boothe v. Wyrick, 452 F. Supp. 1304 (W.D. Mo. 1978). (3) Conspiracy
by public officials: Seltzer v. Missouri, 517 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D. Mo. 1981);
Franklin v. Webb, 510 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Mo. 1981); McClain v. Kitchen, 505
F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Frankoviglia v. Wyrick, 495 F. Supp. 167 (E.D.
Mo. 1980); .United States ex rel. Tyler v. Hall, 444 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
(4) Involuntary guilty plea: Dunn v. Wyrick, 528 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Mo. 1981);
Greenhaw v. Wyrick, 472 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Mo. 1979). (5) Improperjury selec-
tion: Conley v. White, 470 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Ross v. Wyrick, 446 F.
Supp. 178 (E.D. Mo. 1978). (6) Statutory attacks: Moore v. Wyrick, 510 F. Supp.
1214 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (construction of statute); Green v. Wyrick, 462 F. Supp.
357 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (statute unconstitutional); Boothe v. Wyrick, 452 F. Supp.
1304 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (statute erroneously applied). (7) Double jeopardy: Simp-
son v. Wyrick, 527 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Burnside v. Wyrick, 501 F.
Supp. 1389 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Turner v. Wyrick, 452 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Mo.
1978). (8) Improper jury instructions: Cole v. Wyrick, 505 F. Supp. 69 (E.D.
Mo. 1980); Boothe v. Wyrick, 452 F. Supp. 1304 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Young v.
Wyrick, 451 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Mo. 1978). (9) Excessive sentence: Jenkins v.
Wyrick, 480 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Brooks v. Wyrick, 486 F. Supp. 939
(E.D. Mo. 1979). (10) Petitioner not given informants' names: Johnson v.
Wyrick, 501 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Mo. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1013 (1981);
Turner v. Wyrick, 452 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Mo. 1978). (11) Miscellaneous
grounds: Dunn v. Wyrick, 528 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (lack of jurisdic-
tion); Cox v. Wyrick, 528 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (defendant prevented from
testifying); United States ex rel. Cummings v. Wyrick, 525 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo.
1981) (prejudicial evidence allowed); Thomas v. Wyrick, 520 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.
Mo. 1981) (character witnesses not allowed); Lee v. Wyrick, 499 F. Supp. 310 (E.D.
Mo. 1980) (lack ofjurisdiction, no probable cause); Franco v. Wyrick, 465 F. Supp.
679 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (denial of right to cross-examine witness).
91. Veneri v. Circuit Court, 528 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Dunn v.
Wyrick, 528 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Moore v. Wyrick, 510 F. Supp. 1214
(E.D. Mo. 1981); Franklin v. Webb, 510 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Mo. 1981); McClain
v. Kitchen, 505 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Mo. 198 1);Johnson v. Wyrick, 501 F. Supp.
174 (E.D. Mo. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1013 (1981); McLallen v. Wyrick, 494
F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Mo. 1980);Jenkins v. Wyrick, 480 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Mo.
1979); Greenhaw v. Wyrick, 472 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Conley v. White,
470 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Green v. Wyrick, 462 F. Supp. 357 (W.D. Mo.
1978); Boothe v. Wyrick, 452 F. Supp. 1304 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Greggv. Wyrick,
449 F. Supp. 969 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Thompson v. White, 442 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D.
Mo. 1978); United Statesexrel. Tyler v. Goins, 444 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
Failure to exhaust state remedies, however, was held not fatal to two habeas
corpus petitions. See Thomas v. Wyrick, 520 F. Supp. 139, 140 (E.D. Mo. 1981)
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dismiss petitions.92 In two cases, writs of habeas corpus were granted, but
even in these cases the effects were stayed to allow Missouri courts an op-
portunity to retry the petitioners. 93
The reluctance of federal courts to overturn state postconviction deter-
minations was emphasized in 1981 and 1982 by the United States Supreme
Court. In Sumner v. Mata, 94 the Court reiterated its position that determina-
tions of fact, made by a state court of proper jurisdiction and "evidenced
in writing," are to be presumed correct in federal habeas corpus cases. 95
In Rose v. Lundy, 96 the Court held that federal district judges must dismiss
habeas corpus cases brought by state prisoners if state procedures were not
exhausted with regard to some of the claims, even though they were ex-
hausted for other claims in the petition. 97 This raises some questions about
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in Seemiller v. Wyrick, 9 8 which held that if the state courts were too slow in
deciding habeas corpus claims, the federal courts could proceed although
state remedies had not been exhausted. 99 In short, Missouri's federal district
courts and the United States Supreme Court show little eagerness to interfere
with state court decisions in postconviction cases.
Perhaps partly in response to this unwillingness, the number of federal
habeas corpus petitions is decreasing, 100 and the trend is evident in
(federal district court to hear claim because pending in that court since 1979); Burn-
side v. Wyrick, 501 F. Supp. 1389, 1390 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (exhaustion not required,
petitioner's claim without merit). The validity of these decisions is doubtful in light
of a 1982 United States Supreme Court decision. See text accompanying notes 96-97
supra.
92. "One well known tenent [sic] of federalism is the policy against interfer-
ing with state court proceedings." Seltzer v. Missouri, 517 F. Supp. 1253, 1254
(E.D. Mo. 1981). The United States Supreme Court has said, "The rule of ex-
haustion in federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of federal-state
comity." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973).
93. McLallen v. Wyrick, 498 F. Supp. 137, 139 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (involun-
tary confession due to promise of leniency); Toliver v. Wyrick, 469 F. Supp. 583,
607-08 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (violations of sixth amendment and Miranda).
94. 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
95. Id. at 547-48. See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1963);
McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 213 (8th Cir. 1974); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(1976).
96. 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982) (plurality).
97. Id. at 1199.
98. 663 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1981).
99. Id. at 807-08.
100. The following table categorizes petitions filed by state prisoners in United
States District Courts in recent years:
Total Habeas Mandamus Civil
Year Petitions Corpus Etc. Rights
1975 14,260 7,843 289 6,128
1976 15,029 7,833 238 6,958
[Vol. 47804
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Missouri. 0 1 The number of filings for appeal in federal habeas corpus cases
is increasing, however, in the Eighth Circuit. 10 2 It seems that, while fewer
prisoners are filing federal habeas corpus petitions, more are appealing
denials or dismissals.
Since the 1963 trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases, 103 there
has been some tightening of the reins on federal habeas corpus review. Fay
v. Noia took a strong stand on the necessity of federal review, speaking of
the "power and duty" of the federal courts to provide effective remedies
to those deprived of liberty without due process. 04 The Court stressed that
conventional notions of finality would not be allowed to defeat federal
review:105 " [W]e have consistently held that federal court jurisdiction is con-
ferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated
by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings. State procedural
Total Habeas Mandamus Civil
Year Petitions Corpus Etc. Rights
1977 14,846 6,866 228 7,752
1978 16,969 7,033 206 9,730
1979 18,502 7,123 184 11,195
1980 19,574 7,031 146 12,397
% change
(1980/1975) 37.3 -10.4 -49.5 102.3
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR 62
(1980). Federal public defender offices likewise show a downward trend in demand
for their services. Thirty-two federal public defender and seven community defender
organizations existed in mid-1980, up one from 1979. The volume of cases assigned
to federal public defenders, however, decreased 1.2 % from 1979 to 13,913 cases
in fiscal 1980. Interestingly, the number of hours in court per closed case spent by
federal public defenders in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri is the lowest in the nation at .7 hours. Id. at 117.
101. Federal habeas corpus filings by state prisoners in Missouri district courts
were as follows:




Telephone interview with LorraineJenkins, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts,
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 22, 1981).
102. The figures for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
are as follows:




ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR 46
(1980); id. at 48 (1979); id. at 47 (1978).
103. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
104. 372 U.S. at 441.
105. Id. at 424.
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rules plainly must yield to this overriding federal policy." ' 10 6 In 1977, the
United States Supreme Court reassessed this "overriding federal policy"
and rejected the sweeping language of Fay. 107 Citing the well-established prin-
ciple of federalism that a decision made by a state court ahd grounded on
adequate state substantive law is not amenable to federal review, 10 8 the Court
extended this principle to preclude habeas corpus review of federal constitu-
tional issues when an independent and adequate state procedural ground
exists. 0 9 In the previous year, the Court held in Stone v. Powell"' that where
a state has afforded a state prisoner an opportunity for full and fair litigation
of a fourth amendment claim that trial evidence was gained by an uncon-
stitutional search and seizure, federal habeas corpus relief is not constitu-
tionally required. I "' These decisions may indicate that Fay and its companion
cases I 2-and federal review in general-have indeed had the salutary ef-
fect of improving state records and postconviction procedures.
B. The Need for State Postconviction Review
Federalism is a prime reason for maintaining an effective postconvic-
tion relief system. With effective procedures, a state can preclude, to some
degree, interference by federal district courts in state criminal cases. As one
commentator concluded, "Missouri courts should be masters of their own
criminal proceedings; they should maximize the finality of Missouri
convictions."' 13 A related interest promoted by effective state procedures
is having decisions made by local judges: "[Tlhe trial court, familiar with
the prior proceedings, generally represents the better and more expeditious
forum for post-conviction proceedings."1 4
Postconviction relief procedures are also needed, regardless of the forum,
because some constitutionally significant trial or pleading infirmities can-
not be recognized in time for direct appeal. Such infirmities often will not
106. Id. at 426-27.
107. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-89 (1977).
108. Id. at 82.
109. Id. The adequate state procedural ground in Wainwright was failure, under
Florida law, to make a timely objection at trial to admission of a confession. Id.
at 87-88. The Court said that when federal courts refuse to honor a state's contem-
poraneous objection rule, it "tends to detract from the perception of the trial of a
criminal case in state court as a decisive and portentous event." Id. at 90. The pro-
cedural default rule is in effect in Missouri Rule 27.26 cases: "It is ... settled law
in Missouri that in our post-conviction relief practice under Rule 27.26, a procedural
default bars review of even a constitutional claim in a 27.26 proceeding." Benson
v. State, 611 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
110. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
111. Id. at 481-82. See 42 Mo. L. REv. 127 (1977).
112. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
113. Anderson, supra note 61, at 46.
114. Tyler v. Swenson, 427 F.2d 412, 417 (8th Cir. 1970). The American Bar
Association agrees that the trial court is the preferable forum. See note 247 infra.
806 [Vol. 47
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/7
1982] RULE 27.26 807
appear in trial or guilty plea records, and evidentiary hearings are required.
Ineffective assistance of counsel, for example, is an infirmity that can best
be resolved by a postconviction remedy."1- It can affect the validity of a trial
or guilty plea without being apparent during the proceedings. A prisoner
might not even discover that his lawyer had a conflict of interest or failed
to interview witnesses until the statutory period for appeal had lapsed. 16
The major hurdle for a'direct appeal would be the lack of a complete record
for review. 11 7 Missouri appellate courts almost invariably refuse to hear in-
effective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal except where adequate
records exist for determining the merits.I" Generally, an evidentiary hearing
is required on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the appellate
courts insist on Rule 27.26 as the appropriate procedure for the hearing. 119
Other constitutional infirmities, for the same reasons, may also require
evidentiary hearings. 20
In summary, postconviction review is necessary to protect constitutional
rights to due process. The Missouri and United States Constitutions say
habeas corpus must not be suspended, 12' and the United States Supreme
Court has, in effect, said that if state courts do not provide adequate postcon-
viction procedures, the federal courts will. 1 22 In the interests of justice,
federalism, and finality, state courts need to provide effective postconvic-
tion review. It must be available to all if it is to be effective. It should be
cost-effective. Thus, the question essentially becomes: How can the state
provide quality review for all prisoners in the most cost-effective manner?
115. Ineffective assistance of counsel is currently the most common ground for
relief cited in postconviction petitions. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
116. Even if the prisoner finds out in time to raise the issue on direct appeal,
there is the complicating factor that the same lawyer who handles the trial general-
ly handles the appeal. A different lawyer, of course, could be appointed and an ex-
tension of time for filing the appeal could be granted.
117. "In most cases the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel can best be
raised in a postconviction motion under Rule 27.26 ... because the issue usually
arises after the trial has concluded and the facts pertinent thereto are not fully
developed." State v. McClain, 541 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. App., Spr. 1976) (cita-
tions omitted).
118. See, e.g., State v. Larrabee, 572 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978);
State v. Goodson, 558 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); State v. Lindley,
545 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); State v. Bums, 537 S.W.2d 860,
863 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
119. See, e.g., State v. Umfleet, 587 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979);
State v. Crockett, 543 S.W.2d 314, 322 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
120. Among these circumstances are denial of assistance of counsel during a
critical stage, denial of the right to confront witnesses, incompetence to stand trial,
and use of perjured testimony by the state. For a more complete list, see McCrary
v. State, 529 S.W.2d 467, 483 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
121. See note 3 supra.
122. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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V. THE NEW PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM
Regardless of the precise procedure used for postconviction review, the
public defender system should be an integral part of it. Appointed counsel
have proved too expensive, 123 and the quality of representation from con-
scripted, inexperienced attorneys has been questioned. 124 The newly enacted
public defender system is a starting point for effective postconviction relief.
A. An Overview
On March 11, 1982, Governor Bond signed into law a bill that makes
broad and much-needed changes in the public defender and appointed
counsel system. 125 Because of the financial crisis in that system, the law went
into effect on April 1, 1982.126
123. See notes 40-47 and accompanying text supra.
124. See note 145 infra.
125. House Comm. Substitute for H.R. 1169, 81st Gen. Assem. Res. Sess.
(1982). The public defender system will continue to operate under a seven-member,
unsalaried commission. Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.015.1, .5 (Cum. Supp. 1982), but
no longer will a member of the Missouri Supreme Court automatically sit on the
commission:
[Tihe recommendation of the Commission is that noJustice of the Supreme
Court should sit on the Commission. We say that for the very good reason
that those people should not be put in the comprising [sic] position of having
to help run a legislative program dealing with matters which severely af-
fect constitutional rights and, at the same time, have to hear cases and
decide cases in which those constitutional rights come in the [sic] question.
Hearings, supra note 1,' at 5 (Kansas City, Mo. Sept. 23, 1981) (testimony of Bur-
ton Shostak). Nor did the Missouri Bar, in its proposal submitted as Senate Bill
No. 790, want a supreme court judge on the commission. Its proposal said, "Judges,
prosecutors and law enforcement officials shall not serve on the commission." S.
790, 81st Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. § 600.015.1 (1982). The judges also agreed that
it would be better not to have one of their number on the commission. Hearings,
supra note 1, at 25-26 (Kansas City, Mo. Sept. 23, 1981) (testimony of Missouri
Supreme CourtJudgeJohn Bardgett).
All seven members of the commission will be selected by the "governor with the
advice and consent of the senate." MO. REV. STAT. § 600.015.1 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
Having the governor appoint all seven members is a new wrinkle in the system added
by the legislature and not proposed by either the Public Defender Commission or
the Missouri Bar. The Missouri Bar had proposed a 13-member commission. S.
790, 81st Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. § 600.015.1 (1982).
126. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 600.010-.900 (Cum. Supp. 1982). The public defender
system was established to handle felony cases in 14 of Missouri's 43 judicial cir-
cuits in 1972. The system expanded to 18 circuits in 1976 and its scope of service
was enlarged to include juvenile and misdemeanor cases. The Public Defender
Commission also was established in 1976. Annual Statistical Report, supra note 30,
at 1 (1979-1980). In 1980, the General Assembly added six additional judicial cir-
cuits to the public defender program. Id. at 1-2. Public defender services thus were
available to roughly 76% of Missourians, or 3.7 million persons. Id. at 2.
Under the prior law, the Public Defender Commission administered the budget
808 [Vol. 47
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Costs for appointed counsel quadrupled in the five years after 1976, and
legislative appropriations did not keep pace. 127 In response to the financial
crisis created by inadequate funding, the Missouri Supreme Court set tem-
porary guidelines for the appointment of counsel to indigents, 128 and the
Public Defender Commission put ceilings on the amounts appointed counsel
could charge regardless of the number of hours spent on a case. 129 Perhaps
ChiefJustice Donnelly best summed up the public defender system; he called
it "undernourished and overworked. " 130
On a per-case basis, it has been more than twice as expensive for the
state to have appointed counsel represent an indigent client than to have
a public defender do so. 13 1 Therefore, the Public Defender Commission has
and operations of the public defender and appointed counsel system. It appointed
public defenders for four-year terms, while the court could appoint private counsel
if there was no public defender or if the public defender was disqualified. MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 600.015.1, .020.2, .075 (1978) (repealed 1982). Separate funds were ap-
propriated for the public defender program and for appointed counsel, as shown
below:
Public Appointed
Fiscal Year Defender Counsel Total
1975-76 $1,365,733 $411,754 $1,777,487
1976-77 $1,417,636 $ 865,485 $2,283,121
1977-78 $1,817,473 $ 735,000 $2,552,473
1978-79 $1,948,234 $ 776,000 $2,724,234
1979-80 $2,280,347 $1,126,820 $3,407,167
Annual Statistical Report, supra note 30, at 7 (1979-1980). The figures of the
Missouri State Auditor vary slightly. See Auditor's Report, supra note 41, at 8. For
1981, the auditor lists public defender expenditures as $2,273,262 and appointed
counsel expenditures as $1,387,557 for a total of $3,660,819. Id. at 43. The entire
,public defender and appointed counsel system operated under a statutory budget
ceiling, which was set at $5,000,000 for fiscal 1981 and 1982. Annual Statistical
Report, supra note 30, at 2 (1979-1980). For fiscal years 1977 and 1978, the ceiling
was $2.8 million dollars. Id. at 1 (1977-1978). For fiscal years 1979 and 1980, the
ceiling was $3.5 million. Id. at 2 (1979-1980).
127. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text supra.
128. See note 32 supra.
129. See note 43 supra.
130. Address by Robert Donnelly, Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme
Court, to the 102nd Annual Meeting of the Missouri Bar Association in Kansas
City, Missouri (Sept. 24, 1981), reprinted in Donnelly, The State of the Judiciary in
Missouri, 37J. MO. B. 515,517 (1981). Accordingto Howard Eisenberg, Executive
Director of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, "Nationally $1.49
is spent per capita for indigent defense in the United States on an average of all
52 jurisdictions including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Missouri is
46th on that list at 79¢ per capita." Hearings, supra note 1, at 83 (Kansas City, Mo.
Sept. 23, 1981).
131. A comparison of costs between public defenders and appointed counsel
appears in the following table:
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maintained that "appointed counsel to the greatest extent possible should
be eliminated from the system.' 32 The new public defender system ac-
complishes this goal.
While formerly there were statutorily-mandated area restrictions for
public defender offices, the new law allows offices to be established, or in
some cases eliminated, where needed.1 33 To meet needs in areas where public
Fiscal Year Public Defenders Appointed Counsel
Cases Cost/Case Cases Cost/Case
1975-76 13,968 $98 2,216 $186
1976-77 24,136 $59 2,932 $296
1977-78 22,963 $79 3,374 $218
1978-79 28,338 $69 3,305 $235
1979-80* 20,810 $110 3.194 $353
*For 1979-80, a new method was used to gain greater uniformity in reporting
caseloads. Some public defender offices previously had reported their caseloads by
counts filed, causing some inflation in the figures. Annual Statistical Report, supra
note 30, at 7-8 (1979-1980). The costs per case for public defenders, however, do
not include the hidden costs of staff support. Hearings, supra note 1, at 102 (St. Louis,
Mo. Oct. 7, 1981) (testimony ofJudge Richardson).
132. Hearings, supra note 1, at 8 (Kansas City, Mo. Sept. 23, 1981) (testimony
of Burton Shostak). The State Auditor agrees: "[A]ny changes in procedures which
shift representing the indigent from appointed counsel to public defenders appear
to be moves in the right direction." Auditor's Report, supra note 41, at 37.
133. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.021.4 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Gone from the statute
is the exclusion of Judicial Circuit 31, Greene County, from having a public
defender. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.010(1978 &Cum. Supp. 1981) (repealed 1982).
Both the Public Defender Commission and Missouri Bar had proposed elimina-
tion of the Greene County exclusion. S. 790, 81st Gen. Assem., 2d. Sess. (1982);
Public Defender Commission Proposal 1, Draft 1 (1981). The State Auditor also
recommended that a public defender office be established in Greene County.
Auditor's Report, supra note 41, at 37. Some Greene County attorneys had been
making as much as $10,000 a year as appointed counsel. One attorney, for exam-
ple, made $10,819.50 on 25 cases in fiscal 1981 prior to use of fiscal 1982 funds to
pay any further obligations owed to court-appointed attorneys. Missouri Supreme
Court, Financial Accounting System Accounts Payable Disbursement Register (July
1, 1980-Aug. 31, 1981). Another attorney collected $9,656.75 for 21 cases. Half-
a-dozen other attorneys earned between $5,230.50 and $8,355.25 as appointed
counsel in Greene County. Id. Greene County had a volunteer system for court
appointment to represent indigents; if a lawyer was not on the list of volunteers,
he or she would not be appointed. Hearings, supra note 1, at 24 (Kansas City, Mo.
Sept. 23, 1981) (testimony of Senator Bradshaw); telephone interview with Senator
Bradshaw (Oct. 21, 1981). But Senator Bradshaw noted that because of scant fund-
ing, the volunteer system was not working as well in 1981 as it had in 1980.
Telephone interview, supra.
On the other hand, in sparsely populated areas where public defender offices are
not cost-effective, the Commission can now eliminate those offices altogether. For
example, the public defender office in judicial Circuit 40, Newton and McDonald
Counties, has not been cost-effective. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (St. Louis, Mo.
24
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defenders are not cost-effective or where there are conflict cases, the Com-
mission may contract with private attorneys to provide representation. 1
34
Contracting with counsel is greatly facilitated by the centralization and
autonomy that the new office of the director will provide. 135 The director
has the power to contract with private attorneys on a case-by-case basis "as
Oct. 7, 1981) (testimony of Burton Shostak). But since it has a population over
75,000, Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.010 (1978) (repealed 1982) mandated that it have
a public defender office.
134. It may do so "in such areas of the state and on such terms as it deems ap-
propriate." Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.021.6 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Conflicts arise, for
instance, in cases involving co-defendants. The number of conflict cases has been
substantial. In fiscal 1980, 848 appointed counsel billings came from circuits which
have public defenders. That number constituted roughly one-fourth of the total bill-
ings for appointed counsel and accounted for 44% of the total cost of appointed
counsel. Annual Statistical Report, supra note 30, at 23 (1979-1980). The price tag
was $499,013. In fiscal 1979, 37 % of the total cost for appointed counsel came from
public defender circuits, amounting to $326,192. Auditor's Report, supra note 41,
at 36. On an average, public defender circuits spent 17.91% of their total outlays
for appointed counsel in fiscal 1980 and 14.3% in fiscal 1979. Id. Due to a high
number of conflict cases, some of the highest costs for appointed counsel in the 43
judicial circuits were incurred in circuits which had public defenders. In 1980, the
highest total cost for appointed counsel in any circuit was forJudicial Circuit 22,
St. Louis City, with a total cost of $167,981. Judicial Circuit 16, Jackson County,
was third on the list at $120,382, while judicial Circuit 21, St. Louis County, was
fourth with a cost of $96,805. Id. at 44. It should be noted that these three areas
combined provide almost half of the prisoner population in Missouri and thus of-
fer many opportunities for co-defendant conflicts. MISSOURI DIVISION OF COR-
RECTIONS, BIENNIAL REPORT 43, 48 (1976-1978); id. at 67 (1978-1980).
135. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.019 (Cum. Supp. 1982). The autonomy of the state
public defender is apparent from the language of the statute: "The office of state
public defender is hereby created and established as an independent department
of the judicial branch of state government." Id. § 600.019.1. The Public Defender
Commission is to appoint a lawyer experienced in criminal defense as the direc-
tor. Id. § 600.019.2. The director will devote full time to his office, serving a four-
year term at a salary set by the commission but not to exceed the salary of a circuit
judge. Id. § 600.019.3, .4.
Gone from the public defender and appointed counsel system is the Office of State
Courts Administrator, which in the past provided support staff. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 600.015.6 (1978) (repealed 1982). The Public Defender Commission will now
select its own staff, providing more autonomy for the new system. Id. §600.017.2
(Cum. Supp. 1982). The old system was "burdensome" to the Office of State Courts
Administrator, and the new system should be "better served" by its own staff and
people. Hearings, supra note 1, at 7 (Kansas City, Mo. Sept. 23, 1981) (testimony
of Burton Shostak). See also id. at 26 (testimony ofJudge Bardgett). The budget will
be "submitted directly to the governor and general assembly by the director," after
approval by the Commission. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.040.2 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
The budget formerly was submitted by the Office of State Courts Administrator
as part of the Judicial Budget.
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the commission deems necessary considering the needs of the area." 136 Fees
will be established by the Commission. 137
Public defenders will continue to serve four-year terms. The Commis-
sion was hampered.in the past by low, inflexible, statutorily set wages, but
no longer are specific wages mandated by statute. Wage flexibility should
help alleviate the earlier recruitment and turnover problems.138 The provi-
136. Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.042.1(10) (Cum. Supp. 1982). See also id. §
600.011.1. For the prior statute on contracting, see id. § 600.080 (1978) (repealed
1982). The Executive Director of the National Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion had advised against a contract system where one lawyer or a group of them
agrees either to represent all indigents or a certain number of them for a specified
fee. Although contract systems have appeal as being cheap, they do not have a
"suitable track record." H. Eisenberg, Remarks to the joint judiciary Commit-
tees of the Missouri Senate and House of Representatives, at 18-20 (Sept. 23,
1981)(memorandum circulated to Committee members during Hearings, supra note
1). Experiments with contract systems in San Diego, California, and Vancouver,
Washington show an initial low bid followed by a great increase in costs in the sec-
ond and third years. Vancouver subsequently abandoned its contract system. Id.
Another organization warns that "in no event should the state's contract for
defender services be let on the basis of competitive bidding, since the inevitable result
of such a practice is to undermine the quality of services." National Study Com-
mission on Defense Services, Model State DefenderAct, in GUIDE TO ESTABLISHING
A DEFENDER SYSTEM 104 (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice, 1978).
137. Mo. REV. STAT. 5 600.042.1(10) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
138. The compensation for public defenders will now be set by the Commis-
sion. Id. § 600.021.3. The Commission should be able to close some of the gap be-
tween public defenders' and prosecuting attorneys' salaries. Statutorily set salaries
for public defenders have lagged far behind those for prosecuting attorneys, as has
the number of assistants statutorily permitted. In circuits with a population ex-
ceeding 500,000, public defenders received an annual salary of $29,500; in all other
circuits the annual salary was $24,000. Id. § 600.030 (1978) (repealed 1982). This
represented a raise, effectiveJuly 1, 1979, from $22,000 in the metropolitan areas
and $17,500 elsewhere. From 3 to 21 assistant public defenders could be appointed,
depending on the description and size of the circuit, at pay ranging from $10,000
to $23,000 per year. Assistants were appointed by and served at the pleasure of a
circuit's public defender. Id. § 600.035.
Prosecuting attorneys do not have their salaries statutorily set in St. Louis County
orJackson County (Kansas City), which have charter forms of government. The
pay in St. Louis County is $40,000 per year and will be raised to $55,000 on January
1, 1983. Telephone interview with Alice Griner, secretary to St. Louis County Pros-
ecuting Attorney Buzz Westfall (Mar. 23, 1982). In Jackson County, the pay is
$42,500 per year. Telephone interview with Vicky Maxon, Jackson County Super-
visor of Classification and Compensation (Mar. 23, 1982). The maximum salary
set by statute in non-charter counties is $45,000.
Turnover was a problem under the old system: "I get a tremendous turnover.
As soon as the lawyers know how to try a case, they're being gobbled up by law
firms or they're out in private practice," says William Shaw, Public Defender of
the 21stJudicial Circuit (St. Louis County). Hearings, supra note 1, at 35 (St. Louis,
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sion that had set a maximum equivalent to 137 full-time employees 139 is also
eliminated from the new statute. Without that limit, there will be more flex-
ibility to ease public defenders' caseloads. 140
Along with the power to expand public defender services into new areas,
hire new personnel, and increase wages of public defenders, the new law
removes the rigid spending ceiling that formerly hampered the system.'14
With elimination of the statutory ceiling, the legislature has granted some
financial flexibility to match the new flexibility in staffing and wages.
Changes were also made in the determination of indigency and in recoup-
ment. Indigency will now be determined in the first instance by public
defenders instead of courts, but an appeal may be made to the court having
jurisdiction.142 Recoupment of amounts paid for legal representation by the
Mo. Oct. 7, 1981). Tim Braun, public defender for the 11th Judicial Circuit,
testified that the average turnover in his office for assistants being paid $10,000 per
year was roughly eight months. Id. at 120. The low salaries paid to public defenders
were certainly a cause for this turnover. Id. at 84 (testimony ofJudge Carl Gaert-
ner). Public defenders have received only one pay raise in nine years and have
received no cost-of-living adjustments. Id. at 38 (testimony of William Shaw). Bur-
ton Shostak says the public defender system lost personnel because of an inability
to raise salaries, and he requested flexibility in salaries. Id. at 8.
139. Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.035 (1978) (repealed 1982).
140. The public defenders' caseload and its effect on the quality of their work
has been a matter of some concern. In an exchange between Joe Downey, Public
Defender for the 22ndJudicial Circuit (St. Louis County) and Senator Bradshaw
from Springfield, Downey said that his office, with one part-time and twenty full-
time lawyers, handled 9118 cases in fiscal 1980-81, at an average cost of $65.02 per
case. The felony lawyers in his office averaged 240 cases per year, which as Senator
Bradshaw stated, is "about six short of being one-a-day felony cases." Senator Brad-
shaw questioned whether any lawyer could competently handle a felony case a day.
The statistics, to him, indicated that, through no fault on the part of the public
defenders, "indigents are not being adequately defended." Hearings, supra note 1,
at 128-29 (St. Louis, Mo. Oct. 7, 1981). In another exchange, the public defender
from the 1 ithJudicial Circuit, Tim Braun, who quoted 262 as the number of cases
per full-time lawyer handled in his office, agreed with Senator Bradshaw that the
only way so many cases could be handled was through a "phenomenal number"
of them being plea bargained. Id. at 120, 124.
An imbalance also was perceived in the use of investigators by prosecuting at-
torneys while public defenders had none. Interview with Betty Wilson, member
of the Public Defender Commission (Oct. 13, 1981). SeeMO. REV. STAT. §56.151
(1978). Under the new statutes, the director of the public defender system, with
the approval of the Commission, will have the power to appoint investigators. Id.
$ 600.042.1(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982). See also id. § 600.021.5.
141. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.160 (Cum. Supp. 1981)(repealed 1982)(maximum
expenditures of $5 million). The Public Defender Commission had proposed
eliminating the ceiling in its first proposal but maintained the ceiling in Proposal
2. Public Defender Commission, Proposal 2, Draft 1 (1981).
142. Mo. REV. STAT. $ 600.086.3 (Cum. Supp. 1982). The statute has
expanded the determination of indigency from a consideration of the "circumstances
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state has a new set of teeth. 143 Contribution can now be required as a precon-
of the case" to a more explicit listing of considerations-"including his ability to
make bond, his income and the number of persons dependent on him for support."
Id. § 600.086.1. The Commission will, as it previously did, provide further
guidelines for determining indigency. Id. § 600.086.2. An innovation is that the
director or those serving under him are empowered to make investigations into the
financial status of anyone seeking a public defender's services. Id. § 600.086.5. The
Public Defender Commission believed that the statutes should contain no defini-
tion of indigency, but that the Commission instead should define it. Hearings, supra
note 1, at 10 (Kansas City, Mo. Sept. 23, 1981) (testimony of Burton Shostak).
The problem of who should determine indigency and what criteria should be used
in appointing counsel has been much debated. Shostak thinks that public defenders
should determine indigency. Id. at 10. Judge Bardgett, a member of the Missouri
Supreme Court who served on the Public Defender Commission, agrees. Id. at
30-33. Judge Mauer from Jackson County disagreed, fearing it could be damag-
ing to the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 74. The Model State Defender Act
has the defender determine indigency. See National Study Commission on Defense
Services, supra note 136, at 110. State AuditorJames Antonio, in a report critical
of indigency determination in Missouri, used Delaware's standards, established
by a public defender administrative rule, to evaluate Missouri's practice. Auditor's
Report, supra note 41, at 28. Antonio claimed that the study his office conducted
showed that 19 % of the determinations of indigency were inaccurate. Id. at 32. In
his words, "I think it's clear from the report.., that the system... is significantly
being abused ..... Hearings, supra note 1, at 41 (Kansas City, Mo. Sept. 23, 1981).
This finding of "significant abuse," however, did not go unchallenged. See id. at
67, 70-71 (testimony of Bill Peters, Jackson County CircuitJudge). Further, it was
pointed out that if costs ofjudge, clerk, bailiff, and prosecutor time had been con-
sidered, the cost for determining indigency would have been "rather staggering,"
although those costs would not have been included in a budget. Id. at 90 (testimony
of Howard Eisenberg). See also id. at 61 (testimony of Bob Berry, Associate Circuit
Judge).
143. Recoupment only occurs, however, if a person is determined able to pro-
vide part or all of the costs of the state public defender services. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 600.090. 1(a), (b) (Cum. Supp. 1982). An ability to pay was also required by id.
§ 600.130 (1978) (repealed 1982). Ability to pay also applies to parents or guardians
of minors. Cf. id. § 600.086.5 (Cum. Supp. 1982) and id. § 600.110 (1978) (repealed
1982). Automatic recoupment was struck down by the United States Supreme Court
as an impermissible burden on the right to counsel, James v. Strange, 407 U.S.
128 (1972), but recoupment conditioned on the ability to pay was sustained, Fuller
v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
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dition of representation for those who are able to bear part of the cost. 144
All in all, the new public defender system is a bold step forward in making
quality legal representation available in the most cost-effective manner.
Lawyers who handle many cases of the same type can develop an expertise
which those unaccustomed to such work do not possess.145 A public defender
accustomed to the relevant law and procedure can process a case more quickly
than an appointed counsel who must first familiarize himself with the basics.
Perhaps more important, a person with expertise will be less likely to make
Annual Statistical Report, supra note 30, at 6 (1979-1980). Only .5 % of the state's
expenditures on public defenders and appointed counsel was recovered in 1980,
and only .4% was recovered in 1979.
144. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.090.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982). The new statutes are
broader than the old recoupment statutes, which only applied to criminal pro-
ceedings. Id. § 600.100 (1978) (repealed 1982). Rule 27.26 proceedings are civil
in nature. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(a). Thus if a person determined to be indigent
had been able to pay all or part of the cost of his representation in a Rule 27.26
proceeding, he could not have been ordered to do so. As a practical matter, most
prisoners can honestly qualify as indigents. Broadening the statute to cover postcon-
viction proceedings, however, cannot harm real indigents and can plug the loophole
which would exist if Rule 27.26 movants are provided representation under the new
system. Repayment can still be made a condition of probation. MO. REV. STAT.
§ 600.093 (Gum. Supp. 1982). This is similar to id. § 600.135.3 (1978) (repealed
1982). Defaults in payments are no longer listed as grounds for contempt citations,
however. See id. § 600.140.
Another change in the recoupment provision is that the "reasonable value of the
services ... may in all cases be a lien on any and all property to which the defen-
dant shall have or acquire an interest." Id. § 600.090.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982). That
part of the claim approved by the court will then be ajudgment at law, which the
prosecuting attorney may enforce, compromise, or, with the director's concurrence,
forego. Id. § 600.090.2(b), (c), (d). The former public defender statutes had only
said, "A default in the payment of a fine or costs or any installment thereof may
be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of ajudgment."
Id. § 600.145 (1978) (repealed 1982). The statutes did have a provision for remis-
sion of payments by the court if the payments were creating an undue hardship.
Id. § 600.135. Although the Public Defender Commission had hoped to retain these
funds for its own use, money so collected will continue to go into the general revenue.
Id. § 600.090.4 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
145. One lawyer put the issue graphically:
A pediatrician is not incompetent, but I don't want him operating on
my brain, if I have a brain tumor. A neurosurgeon is not incompetent,
but I don't want him messing with my children if they're running a 106 0
temperature and they're throwing up. There are lawyers who are ex-
perienced and extraordinarily competent in securities work, and in cor-
porate work, but I would not want them in a court room for any purpose
whatsoever. And, that's what's happening. We are finding that approx-
imately a third of the names that we are getting are.., substantially inex-
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mistakes that come back to haunt the courts and future counsel in the form
of Rule 27.26 motions. 46
There is, however, an unfortunate exception to the new public defender
law-Rule 27.26 movants.
B. Rule 27.26 Representation
The new public defender statute states:
The director and defenders shall provide legal services to an eligi-
ble person:
(a) who is detained or charged with a felony, including appeals
from a conviction in such a case;
(b) who is detained or charged with a misdemeanor which will
probably result in confinement in the county jail upon conviction,
including appeals from a conviction in such a case;
(c) who is detained'or charged with a violation of probation
or parole;
(d) for whom the federal constitution or the state constitution
requires the appointment of counsel; and
(e) for whom, in a case in which he faces a loss or deprivation
of liberty, any law of this state requires the appointment of counsel. 147
The first three categories are clearly inapplicable to Rule 27.26 motions.
The fourth category would only apply if counsel were constitutionally re-
quired in Rule 27.26 cases, but it is not. 148 The last category would only
perienced in any criminal trial work whatsoever ....
Hearings, supra note 1, at 20-21 (St. Louis, Mo. Oct. 7, 1981)(testimony ofAnthony
Sestric). See also id. at 142 (testimony of Joyce Armstrong).
146. Id. at 144 (testimony of Joyce Armstrong).
147. MO. REV. STAT. 5 600.042.3 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
148. The Missouri Supreme Court acknowledges that the United States
Supreme Court has not announced any specific postconviction requirements for
state prisoners. Stateexrel. Smith v. Tillman, 623 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Mo. EnBanc
1981). The United States Supreme Court has required states to appoint counsel
for indigents, if requested, where appeal is of right. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963). The Court, however, refused to.extend the right to appointed counsel
where appeal is discretionary, saying, "[Tlhe fact that a particular service might
be of benefit to an individual does not mean that the service is constitutionally re-
quired. " Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). A state prison regulation ban-
ning "jailhouse lawyer" use by fellow inmates was struck down unless alternative
assistance in drafting legal papers was provided. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969). The Court also found that prisons must provide prisoners with either a law
library or legal assistance adequate for preparing legal papers in order to meet the
fundamental right of access to the court system. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977). Federal courts are not required to automatically appoint counsel for in-
digents seeking postconviction relief in federal courts. Appointment of counsel is
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seem to apply to a future loss of liberty by one not in custody. Perhaps,
however, a court could construe the last subsection to mean a continued loss
of liberty in the future. The question then becomes whether "any law of
this state" requires appointment of counsel in Rule 27.26 cases.
The Missouri Constitution says that "[n]o law shall be passed except
by bill."149 That passage makes it appear that only the General Assembly
may enact "laws." If the legislature meant "statute" when it used the word
"law" in the new public defender legislation, then no Missouri "law" now
requires that Rule 27.26 movants receive appointed counsel.
An amendment to the Missouri Constitution says, "The supreme court
may establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts
and administrative tribunals, which shall have the force and effect of law.
The rules shall not change substantive rights .... Any rule may be annulled
or amended ... by a law limited to the purpose. ' 1 5 0 If the term "law" is
broad enough to cover statutes and Missouri Supreme Court Rules, then
arguably Rule 27.26 movants are required to have counsel by state law. This
amendment does not say that the Missouri Supreme Court can pass laws,
but that its rules "shall have the force and effect of law." A limitation is
also placed on the court's rule-making power: its "rules shall not change
substantive rights." Even if the Missouri Supreme Court can make "laws,"
the question next must be asked whether the putative law affects substan-
tive rights. "In consequence of that limitation it would seem that any rule
which attempted to change or create a substantive right would come within
the purview of the constitutional prohibition."15 1 Rule 27.26(h), which man-
dates appointment of ccunsel for all Rule 27.26 movants, appears to be pro-
cedural, not substantive, but the question has not been litigated. Regardless,
the General Assembly if it so chose could annul or amend Rule 27.26(h),
but only "by a law limited to the purpose.' ' 5 2
The question of whether Rule 27.26(h) creates a substantive right would
discretionary. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Missouri Bar at 14-15, State ex rel. Smith
v. Tillman, 623 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. En Banc 1981) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)
(1976)).
149. MO. CONST. art. III, § 21.
150. Id. art. V, § 5 (amended 1976).
151. Molasky exrel. Clayton Corp. of Delaware v. Lapin, 396 S.W.2d 761, 765
(Mo. App., St. L. 1965). The Missouri Supreme Court has defined procedural rules
as those that "do not create, destroy or modify anyone's primary rights." State
ex rel. Peabody Coal Co. v. Powell, 574 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
Substantive rights have been defined as "the rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion of this state and of the nation. The rights that have been established by custom
and by common law-they shall not be abridged, enlarged nor modified." State
v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11, 21-22 (Mo. En Banc 1977) (Bardgett, J., dissenting)
(quoting former Governor Guy Park, 13 Debates of the Missouri Constitution 3824
(1945)), reversed, 439 U.S. 357 (1978).
152. MO. CONST. art. V, § 5.
1982] RULE 27. 26 817
31
Scott: Scott: Postconviction Remedies under Missouri Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
have been academic under the public defender legislation first passed in
1972, 3 and amended in 1976. 154 These statutes clearly gave the courts the
power to appoint counsel for indigent Rule 27.26 movants. The law was
amended, however, in 1980, to explicitly preclude the use of public defenders
in Rule 27.26 cases. The amendment stated that "no public defender shall
be appointed to represent a defendant who has filed a motion seeking relief
pursuant to Rule 27.26 of the Missouri rules of court, except when a defen-
dant is entitled to appointed counsel by constitutional requirement.'1 55
Similar language concerning appointed counsel was included '156 but in State
ex rel. Smith v. Tillman, 157 it was found not to bar representation by appointed
counsel of Rule 27.26 movants. The Missouri Supreme Court was able to
make that finding because of the paragraphing in the statute involving ap-
pointment of counsel in Rule 27.26 cases. The court held that the prohibi-
tion of counsel except where constitutionally required applied only to parole
revocations.158 Thus, the situation for a short time in Missouri was that only
153. Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.045 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (repealed 1982) said that
public defenders would represent indigents who had "filed within the circuit a peti-
tion for habeas corpus or other post conviction motion alleging his liberty to be
unlawfully restrained by public authority." Id. § 600.060 gave judges in circuits
lacking public defenders the power to appoint lawyers to represent indigents "in
all cases and situations where the public defender would have a duty to provide
representation."
154. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.071 (1978) (repealed 1982). The statute prior to
1980 had stated that the court could appoint counsel for a defendant filing a Rule
27.26 motion in circuit court, but did not add "or the public defender." Id. §
600.071.1. The statute also said that the court could appoint counsel to represent
a defendant who had filed a habeas corpus petition. Id. § 600.071.2. Appellate
courts, however, were explicitly authorized to appoint counsel or public defenders
in Rule 27.26 appeals. Id. § 600.066. Because the statute did not state that the court
could appoint a public defender to represent a Rule 27.26 movant in circuit court,
the conclusion could be drawn that circuit court judges could not appoint public
defenders in Rule 27.26 cases. As a matter of practice, however, all judicial cir-
cuits with public defenders had public defenders representing Rule 27.26 movants,
for a total of 231 cases assigned and 187 cases disposed of in fiscal 1979. During
this same time period, public defenders were assigned 21,621 cases and disposed
of 20,810 cases. Annual Statistical Report, supra note 30, at 17 (1979-1980). Thus,
roughly 1 % of the public defenders' cases handled were postconviction relief cases.
155. Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.066 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (repealed 1982).
156. Id. § 600.071.
157. 623 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. En Banc 1981). A circuit judge had refused to ap-
point counsel for a Rule 27.26 movant on the ground that § 600.071 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes as amended in 1980 prohibited such an appointment. Id. at 243.
158. Id. at 246. According to the session laws, the statute said:
A court may appoint counsel to represent a defendant who:
(1) Has filed within the circuit a motion seeking relief pursuant to rule
27.26 of the Missouri rules of court;
(4) If subject to revocation of parole, whenever the court determines
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appointed counsel could represent Rule 27.26 movants.
In the 1982 public defender legislation, no mention is made of using
public defenders or counsel hired by the public defender director in Rule
27.26 cases. 159 Nor does it acknowledge the requirement of the Fields amend-
ment that courts appoint counsel for indigent Rule 27.26 movants. The 1982
legislation also does not mention court-appointed counsel. It does mention
"assigned counsel," but that is not the same thing: " 'Assigned Counsel'
means private attorneys who are hired by the state public defender director
to handle the cases of eligible persons from time to time on a case basis
.... ,"160 Thus, although the new public defender statutes do not empower
the courts to appoint counsel in Rule 27.26 cases, as they did from the in-
ception of the public defender system until 1980,161 neither are the courts
specifically prohibited from using public defenders in Rule 27.26 cases, as they
were unde' 1980 legislation.1 62
Both the Public Defender Commission proposal and the Missouri Bar
proposal, which were submitted for legislative consideration as models for
public defender legislation, explicitly included legal representation for Rule
27.26 movants.163 It therefore appears that omission of Rule 27.26 movants
that the interests ofjustice so require and that such person is indigent. No
counsel shall be appointed except when a defendant is entitled to appointed
counsel by constitutional requirement.
1980 Mo. Laws 502-03. The court says, "The above is reproduced accurately in
1980 Laws of Missouri 502-03. Section 600.071 as set out in Missouri Revised
Statutes 1980 Cumulative Supplement does not comport with either
S.S.S.C.S.H.B. 1665 or Laws of Missouri." 623 S.W.2d at 243 n.1. The 1980 and
1981 cumulative supplements set off the last sentence of § 600.071.4 as a separate
paragraph. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.071.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981)(repealed 1982).
Thus, "No counsel shall be appointed except when a defendant is entitled to ap-
pointed counsel by constitutional requirement" had appeared to apply to appoint-
ment in Rule 27.26 cases as well.
159. See note 147 and accompanying text supra.
160. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.011.1 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
161. See notes 153 & 154 supra.
162. Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.066 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed 1982).
163. The Public Defender Commission's proposal had stated that the director
was to
Provide legal services . . .[a]t the request of any person determined by
the director to be indigent or upon referral of any court to prosecute the
civil remedies of writ of error, appeal, writ of habeas corpus or other post-
conviction... remedy on behalf of such person before any court, if the
director is first satisfied there is arguable merit to such proceedings.
Public Defender Commission, Proposal 1, § 600.042.14(f) (1981). The Public
Defender Commission would also have provided public defender services for in-
voluntary mental detention cases. Id. § 600.042.14(b), (f). The new public defender
statutes expressly prohibit such representation. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.043 (Cum.
Supp. 1982). The Missouri Bar Proposal would have provided legal services for
anyone eligible "who is entitled to take and process an appeal, or apply for an ex-
traordinary remedy." S. 790, 81st Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. § 600.046(e) (1982).
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by the Missouri General Assembly was not an oversight. The legislature may
have actually intended to deny free legal representation in Rule 27.26 cases
unless it is constitutionally required. RepresentativeJoe Holt, a co-sponsor
of the new public defender legislation, confirms legislative discussion that
the legislation would provide for state-paid attorneys only where it was con-
stitutionally required. 164
Although the Missouri Supreme Court has repeatedly said that legislative
intent must control in interpreting legislation, it has also emphasized that
statutory language is the evidence of that intent. 165 The court expressed its
opinion on the language of the 1982 legislation in State ex rel. Robards v.
Castee, 166 a writ of prohibition case made moot by the repeal of the 1980
amendment to the public defender statutes: "We are not aware of any pro-
vision in the newly enacted Public Defender Law which would require change
or modification of our existing Rule 27.26(h), nor are we aware of any restric-
tions against appointment of the public defender in his official capacity." 167
A writ of prohibition challenging the power of a court to appoint a public
defender in Rule 27.26 cases 168 was denied by the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals for the Western District in an opinion citing Robards. 169
Assuming the Missouri Supreme Court upholds Rule 2 7.26(h) against
all attacks and requires that counsel be provided for all indigent Rule 27.26
movants, the problem of paying such counsel could still develop because of
legislative control of the purse strings. The Missouri Constitution is explicit
that" [n]o money shall be withdrawn from the state treasury except by war-
rant drawn in accordance with an appropriation made by law."170 It would
thus appear that if there are to be state-paid attorneys for Rule 27.26 movants,
the legislature must appropriate the funds.
VI. SOLUTIONS
A conflict may exist under the new public defender system between the
Missouri Supreme Court, which mandates court appointment of counsel
164. Telephone interview with Rep. Joe Holt (June 10, 1982).
165. "This Court's primary responsibility is to ascertain the intent of the
general assembly from the language used, and to give effect to that intent."
Goldberg v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n, 609 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Mo. En Banc
1980). AccordCity of Willow Springs v. Missouri State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441,
445 (Mo. En Banc 1980); State v. Kraus, 530 S.W.2d 684, 685 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
166. 630 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. En Banc 1982). The public defender ofJasper Coun-
ty brought this action against the CircuitJudge ofJasper County under Mo. REV.
STAT. § 600.066 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed 1982).
167. 630 S.W.2d at 584.
168. State ex rel. Dodson v. Adolf, No. 45776 (Mo. App., W.D. May 28, 1982).
169. Id. The case is being appealed. Telephone interview with Joe Downey,
Public Defender, City of St. Louis (June 10, 1982). In writ of prohibition cases,
the hurdle for the relator may well be the language in the new statute which says
representation may be provided by the public defender system where "any law"
of Missouri so requires. See notes 147-51 and accompanying text supra.
170. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 28.
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to represent indigents seeking postconviction relief, and the General
Assembly, which may have intended to legislatively mandate state-paid
counsel only if constitutionally required.
A. Some Options
Courts appear to have the inherent power to appoint attorneys.171 Un-
paid appointed counsel could be one answer to a conflict, but it would be
no real solution. It would be unfair to attorneys and would precipitate more
suits of the same genre as State v. Green172 and State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy. 173
Further, the indigent Rule 27.26 movant may be stuck with an unpaid, con-
scripted attorney who likely would be neither experienced in Rule 27.26 work
nor highly motivated to learn its intricacies.
A second answer would be to turn back the clock to the pre-Fields amend-
ment days when more affluent prisoners hired attorneys to draw up their
Rule 27.26 motions, while indigent prisoners were left to file "inarticulate
and inartful" pro se petitions.17 4 These petitions, and the appeals from sum-
mary denials of hearings they created, would be upon Missouri courts once
again. 75 And there is certainly no lack of appeals from denials and dismissals
in Rule 27.26 cases as it is. 176 Yet this second option seems to be what the
Missouri General Assembly prefers.
A third answer would be to amend the new statutes to permit represen-
tation of indigent Rule 27.26 movants by the new public defender system.' 77
171. This position is taken in a Missouri Bar brief:
Amicus here urges that the trial courts have discretionary authority to ap-
point counsel if it appears to the courts after an initial judicial evaluation
that a serious and substantial or material violation of constitutional rights
may have transpired which would vitiate the conviction under atteck [sic]
in the motion. Such discretionary authority in the state courts is believed
necessary to protect the rights of persons, a responsibility which is generally
vested in the state courts under the general obligation to protect the con-
stitutional rights of citizens which arise under both the state and federal
constitutions.
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Missouri Bar at 19, State ex rel. Smith v. Tillman, 623
S.W.2d 242 (Mo. En Banc 1981). The brief also recommended that appointment
of counsel in Rule 27.26 cases be discretionary as it is in federal habeas corpus cases.
Id. at 22-23. But this would seem a return to the Smith case-by-case method and
the problems the Missouri Supreme Court tried to correct by adopting its per se
rule on appointed counsel in Fields. See notes 17-27 and accompanying text supra.
172. 470 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. EnBanc 1971). See text accompanying note 28supra.
173. 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. En Banc 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1000 (1982).
See note 32 supra.
174. Fields v. State, 572 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
175. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
176. See Part III.B. supra.
177. Of course, amending the new public defender statutes to provide for legal
representation of indigent Rule 27.26 movants would not preclude also amending
postconviction procedure itself. See Parts IX. & X. infra.
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This would prevent a representation gap which could otherwise develop be-
tween affluent and indigent prisoners in constitutionally mandated habeas
corpus cases if either (1) the court decided that the new public defender legisla-
tion precluded state-paid counsel for Rule 27.26 movants so long as such
representation was not constitutionally required, or (2) the legislature decided
not to fund representation for Rule 27.26 movants and the Missouri Supreme
Court, in the absence of such funding, decided not to compel pro bono
representation. Even if the Missouri Supreme Court ultimately decides that
the new public defender legislation does permit representation in Rule 27.26
cases and the legislature continues the funding, an amendment would be
desirable to make clear that the Missouri legislature stands behind the state's
highest court on postconviction representation for indigents. The vast positive
changes in the public defender system could be extended to provide quality,
cost-effective representation for indigent prisoners seeking postconviction
relief. The legislature has already provided the framework; only a one-
sentence addition to Missouri Revised Statutes section 600.086.1178 would
be needed.
There is a problem in trying to extend public defender services to Rule
27.26 movants that does not exist when the state provides public defenders
for criminal defendants. One-third of Rule 27.26 movants claim ineffective
assistance of counsel as their ground for relief 1 79 In such cases the original
defense attorney could not represent the movant in the Rule 27.26 motion.
If the public defender originally represented him, the Public Defender Com-
mission or the director might well be forced to hire a private attorney to avoid
ethical problems.180 Visions of the past, with lawyers' fees of $390 per Rule
27.26 case, might seem to militate against providing representation for Rule
27.26 movants.' 8 1 But those costs should not occur under the framework
of the 1982 legislation.
Under the new system, which permits contracting by the Public Defender
Commission, the director would contract for Rule 27.26 representation. 18 2
Contracting has some advantages over appointment: (1) unwilling lawyers
who know nothing about Rule 27.26 procedure will not be coerced into taking
Rule 27.26 cases; 183 and (2) the director, in contracting, does not have to
pass on what is viewed as a burden the way the courts seemed to do. The
director can seek to contract with lawyers who know, or who are at least will-
ing to learn, Rule 27.26 procedure. Lawyers who repeatedly handle Rule
27.26 cases will gain expertise. The director can avoid the expense created
when the state had to pay court-appointed attorneys who were unfamiliar
with Rule 27.26 procedure to learn the basics. With expertise comes effi-
178. (Cum. Supp. 1982). For its content, see text accompanying note 147 supra.
179. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
180. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.021.6, .042.1(10) (Gum. Supp. 1982). See also
notes 134-37 and accompanying text supra.
181. See notes 30, 46 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
182. See note 136 and accompanying text supra.
183. See note 32 supra.
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ciency; with efficiency comes a reduction in cost per case. Expertise also leads
to quality representation. In short, under the contracting framework pro-
vided by the legislature, quality cost-effective representation of Rule 27.26
movants could be provided even in ineffective assistance of counsel cases.
Eliminating appointed attorneys from Rule 27.26 cases is a positive step.
Eliminating representation in Rule 27.26 cases for all but those who can af-
ford it is not. The Public Defender Commission proposed that Rule 27.26
movants be represented by the public defender system. So did the Missouri
Bar. 18 4 The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Jusice call for
such representation.185 The Missouri Supreme Court mandates represen-
tation, though it calls for the courts to appoint counsel. 186 The need for
postconviction representation is recognized by those most familiar with post-
conviction relief procedure.
The legislature should amend its new public defender statutes to per-
mit the new system to handle Rule 27.26 cases. Similarly, the Missouri
Supreme Court should amend Rule 27.26(h) to reflect the fact that courts
will no longer conscript private attorneys in Rule 27.26 cases but will ap-
point public defenders or attorneys who have contracted with the director
of the public defender system.
B. The Donnelly Plan
Beside the questions of whether and how to provide state-paid attorneys,
another major question concerning postconviction review is how to attain
finality. ChiefJustice Robert T. Donnelly of the Missouri Supreme Court
says that for all of the fifteen years since Fay v. Noia, 18 7 there has been talk
about finality, but the federal courts will not let it be achieved. Amendment
of habeas corpus to preclude review by federal courts would, he believes,
eliminate the problem. 88
ChiefJustice Donnelly's dislike of federal habeas corpus is not new.189
184. See note 163 supra.
185. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 22-4.3 provides:
(a) Counsel should be provided for applicants unable to afford adequate
representation. For such applicants confined in prison, legal assistance
should be available in the first instance through services provided to in-
mates of the institution. Such services should extend to representation in
judicial proceedings. If, for any reason, applicants are proceeding without
counsel, an attorney should be appointed for those unable to afford to re-
tain their own attorneys. When private attorneys are appointed to repre-
sent applicants, their services should be compensated from public funds.
(b) Appointed counsel should continue to serve through any appellate
proceeding available to the applicant as a matter of right.
186. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(h).
187. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
188. Interview with ChiefJustice Donnelly, supra note 87.
189. Referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976), ChiefJustice Donnelly said in
1969, "[T]he people of Missouri are entitled to know that the effect of this statute
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He sees a "retreat"' 90 from Stone v. Powell'9' in the Supreme Court's 1979
ruling in Jackson v. Virginia:'92
[Iln a challenge to a state criminal conviction brought under 28
U.S.C. 5 2254-if the settled procedural prerequisites for such a
claim have otherwise been satisfied-the applicant is entitled to
habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence ad-
duced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.193
This power of federal judges to act as a "superjury"1 94 was, according to
the chiefjustice, the "coup de grace" that rendered Rule 27.26 useless and
made the burden placed by Rule 27.26 on Missouri lawyers
"unconscionable."11195 As a result ofJackson, he has proposed replacing Rule
27.26 with new rules. 1
96
ChiefJustice Donnelly makes it clear that he believes the failure of Rule
27.26 is not due to the rule itself but to the federal court intervention that
makes state court review futile: "On reflection, we must recognize that we
provided a viable state postconviction remedy but that we failed dismally
in our attempt to ward off the federal judiciary. ... ",197 Although his pro-
.. .is to make... [the Missouri Supreme Court] subservient to the trial courts of
the Federal judicial system in cases involving violations of the criminal laws of the
State." State v. Brizendine, 445 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Mo. En Banc 1969) (emphasis
in original). Donnelly subsequently said that "the Brizendine prediction has proved
alarmingly accurate." Donnelly, The State of the Judiciary in Missouri, 1982, 38J. MO.
B. 81, 83 (1982).
190. See State v. Handley, 585 S.W.2d 458, 466 (Mo. 1979) (Donnelly, C.J.,
concurring).
191. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
192. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). InJackson, the Court listed as prerequisites that "state
remedies have been exhausted.., and that no independent and adequate state
ground stands as a bar." Id. at 321.
193. Flowers v. State, 618 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Mo. En Banc 1981) (Donnelly,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 324) (emphasis in
original). By using the word "rational," Donnelly has said, the United States
Supreme Court is giving "carte blanche" to federal habeas corpus courts to use
their own judgment of a petitioner's guilt instead of the trial jury's. State v. Handley,
585 S.W.2d 458, 466 (Mo. 1979) (Donnelly, C.J., concurring).
194. 585 S.W.2d at 467.
195. Flowers, 618 S.W.2d at 658 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting). Jackson also
renders United States v. MacCollum, 426 U.S. 317 (1976), "ineffectual," says Don-
nelly. Interview with Chief'Justice Donnelly, supra note 87. According toMacCollum,
the fifth amendment guarantee of due process does not create a right to appeal a
conviction, let alone the right to wage a collateral attack on a conviction. 426 U.S.
at 323.
196. Interview with Chief Justice Donnelly, supra note 87. See Flowers, 618
S.W.2d at 658-62 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting), for the text of Donnelly's proposed
rules.
197. Handley, 585 S.W.2d at 467.
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posed Rules 27.26 and 27.27 are similar to current Rule 27.26 in many
respects, there are significant differences. Proposed Rule 27.26 would apply
to postconviction relief after a trial, 19 while proposed Rule 27.27 would deal
with postconviction relief after a plea of guilty.' 99
The current rule provides the "exclusive procedure" for "a prisoner
in custody," which includes prisoners who pleaded guilty or were convicted
after trial. 200 It also applies to both felonies and misdemeanors. Proposed
Rule 27.26 is intended to be the "exclusive procedure" for a "defendant
sentenced after trial" for a felony. 20 1 Only about fifteen percent of Missouri's
prisoners are incarcerated after sentencing based on a trial conviction. 20 2
While current Rule 27.26 lists "violations of the Constitution and laws
198. Flowers, 618 S.W.2d at 658-59 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 661. Chief Justice Donnelly has become disenchanted with the
United States Supreme Court's view of habeas corpus following guilty pleas. He
was hopeful that after the decision in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969),
guilty pleas could be insulated from challenges under Missouri Supreme Court
Rules 27.25 and 27.26 and from federal habeas corpus review. See Flood v. State,
476 S.W.2d 529, 537 (Mo. 1972). In two separate opinions, he used exactly the
same language:
It appears from the majority opinion in Boykin that an on the record ex-
amination conducted by the trial court accepting a guilty plea which in-
cludes, inter alia, an attempt by that Court to satisfy itself that the defen-
dant understands the nature of his charges, his right to trial by jury, the
acts sufficient to constitite the offenses for which he is charged and the per-
missible range of sentences is sufficient to insulate the plea from subsequent
attack in collateral proceedings.
Colbert v. State, 486 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. 1972); Flood v. State, 476 S.W.2d
529, 537 (Donnelly, C.J., concurring) (both cases citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. at 244 n.7). The following year came the United States Supreme Court's per
curiam decision in Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213 (1973). Fontaine involved
a federal prisoner who acknowledged that his plea of guilty was knowing and volun-
tary. The federal district court had made a record, but the United States Supreme
Court concluded that it was not sufficient to preclude a hearing under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1976). 411 U.S. at 215. Donnelly calls cases like Fontaine "destroyers." In-
terview with Chief Justice Donnelly, supra note 87. For the rule of the Missouri
Supreme Court on in-court questioning of a defendant concerning the voluntariness
of the plea and on guilty plea transcription, see MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.02.
200. MO. SuP. CT. R. 27.26.
201. 618 S.W.2d at 659 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
202. The percentage of prisoners in Missouri correctional institutions who
pleaded guilty has remained fairly stable:
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of this State or the United States" as grounds for relief,20 3 the proposed rule
is more limited. Any violation of "the Constitution and Laws of this State"
would trigger proposed Rule 27.26.204 The proposed rule makes no men-
tion of the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The proposed and current rules agree on two occasions for postconvic-
tion relief: when the court imposing sentence lacked jurisdiction to do so,
and when the sentence imposed exceeds the statutory maximum. 20 A fourth,
more nebulous ground for relief in the current rule is omitted from the pro-
posed rule-that the sentence "is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 20 6
Perhaps the most significant change proposed by Chief'Justice Donnelly
concerns the timing of a motion for postconviction relief. The current rule
permits the filing of a motion at any time provided the movant is still in
custody, an appeal is not pending, and time for perfection of an appeal has
elapsed. 20 7 This can result in motions being filed years after a prisoner has
begun serving his term. 2 8 The chief justice proposes ruling on any Rule
27.26 motion before the prisoner goes to the penitentiary. 20 9 Time is of the
essence under proposed Rule 27.26. Immediately after pronouncement of
203. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26. Current American Bar Association Standards ad-
vocate state postconviction procedures broad enough to encompass violations of
the United States Constitution. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 22-2.1 (a)(i), (ii).
204. 618 S.W.2d at 659 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting). See also Handley, 585
S.W.2d at 467, for a discussion of restricting Rule 27.26 claims to violations of the
Missouri Constitution.
205. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26; proposed Rule 27.26, 618 S.W.2d at 658-59 (Don-
nelly, C.J., dissenting).
206. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26.
207. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(b). If the sentence and parole period has been com-
pleted, the remedy for correcting sentence is a writ of coram nobis. Daley, supra
note 35, at 42 (citing Eaton v. State, 586 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979)).
208. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 603 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980) (prisoner
sought to vacate two life sentences imposed in 1952 on grounds of ineffectiveness
of counsel and involuntary guilty pleas).
209. Interview with Chief Justice Donnelly, supra note 87. Proposed Rule
27.26(o specifies that persons invoking it may be out on bail. 618 S.W.2d at 659
(Donnelly, C.J., dissenting). Current American Bar Association Standards for
CriminalJustice agree with Chief'Justice Donnelly that postconviction relief should
not be conditioned on incarceration. The right to seek relief from an invalid con-
viction and sentence ought to exist:
(a) even though the applicant has not yet commenced service of the
challenged sentence;
(b) even though the applicant has completely served the challenged
sentence; or
(c) even though the challenged sentence did not commit the applicant
to prison, but rather a fine, probation, or suspended sentence.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 22-2.3. The Standards also recognize the
desirability of empowering courts to set bail during the pendency of postconvic-
tion procedures. Id. § 22-4.4(c).
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sentence and entry ofjudgment, each defendant would be notified that Rule
27.26 procedures are available. The court would then question the defen-
dant on the record to ensure that he understood the nature, availability, and
time table for a Rule 27.26 motion. 210 After effective notice, the defendant
would only have ten days to file a motion for postconviction relief, but the
time period could be extended for another ten days. 211
Both the current and proposed rules require the filing of a motion form
listing all known grounds for the motion. Both require verification of the
motion by the movant. 21 2 Proposed Rule 27.26, however, contains an ad-
ditional provision requiring an acknowledgment by the movant that he
understands that he waives any grounds not specified in the motion. Soften-
ing this requirement is a provision that the motion can be amended with
leave. 21 3 Both the present and proposed rules prohibit successive Rule 27.26
motions. 2
1 4
While both rules provide that the motion is to be filed with the court
that imposed sentence, 215 proposed Rule 27.26 is more specific as to when
the court shall set the hearing. The proposed rule requires the judge to set
a hearing "not more than fifteen . . . days from the date the motion is
filed.' '216 Given the ten days from sentencing that a defendant would have
to file his motion plus the possible ten-day extension and the fifteen days
210. Proposed Rule 27.26(c), 618 S.W.2d at 659 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
211. Proposed Rule 27.26(d), 618 S.W.2d at 659 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
On timing, the Donnelly plan and the American Bar Association Standards dif-
fer. The Standards state, "A specific time period as a statute of limitation to bar
post-conviction review of criminal convictions is unsound." ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 22, § 22-2.4(a). A time limitation of sorts is recognized under the Stan-
dards, however, as an applicant who waits so long that he commits an "abuse of
process" may be denied relief:
A person with a tenable or meritorious claim for postconviction relief
who deliberately or inexcusably withholds presentation of that claim un-
til occurrence of an event that he or she believes prevents successful
reprosecution or correction of the vitiating error commits an abuse of pro-
cess. Abuse of process ought to be an affirmative defense to be specifically
pleaded and proved by the state. An applicant who commits an abuse of
process may be denied relief.
Id. § 22-2.4(b). The Standards do agree with the Donnelly plan in that "[e]arly
presentation... should be encouraged." Id. § 22-2.2 Commentary. The difference
is between encouraging and strictly enforcing early presentation.
212. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(c); proposed Rule 27.26(d), 618 S.W.2d at 659
(Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
213. Proposed Rule 27.26(d), 618 S.W.2d at 659 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
214. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(d); proposed Rule 27.26(n), 618 S.W.2d at 660
(Donnelly, C.J., dissenting). "Untimely or successive motions" may be filed in
some cases under proposed Rule 27.26(n). See note 231 infra.
215. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(a); proposed Rule 27.26(a), 618 S.W.2d at 659
(Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
216. Proposed Rule 27.26(g), 618 S.W.2d at 659 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
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within which a hearing must be held, a maximum of thirty-five days would
elapse from sentencing to a hearing on postconviction relief. A continuance
could be granted, however, for "good cause." ,217 Under the current rules,
the petitioner is entitled to a "prompt" hearing. "Prompt" means "as soon
as reasonably possible considering other urgent business of the court." But
there is a proviso in the current rule that the proposed rule does not con-
tain: a prompt hearing must be held "[u]nless the motion and the files and
records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief."' 21 8 Under the proposed rule, a hearing would be held in all cases.
Under both rules the hearings are of record, 219 and the movants have
the right to be present. 220 Indigent movants under both rules have a right
to appointed counsel, 22' but the Donnelly plan adds a new twist. Under cur-
rent practice, Rule 27.26 appointed counsel is new counsel. Under the chief
justice's plan, an indigent would retain the appointed attorney who
represented him at trial unless that attorney is relieved by the court. If charged
with ineffectiveness, counsel would be relieved. 222 Since over one-third of
the recent Rule 27.26 cases included a charge of ineffectiveness of counsel, 223
at least that percentage of counsel turnover can be predicted under proposed
Rule 27.26.
The burden of proof remains on the defendant in the Donnelly plan,
and the standard-a preponderance of the evidence-is retained.2 24 If the
defendant meets his burden, the court can vacate the judgment and discharge
or resentence the movant, grant the movant a new trial, or correct the
sentence. Under the current and proposed rules, the court must make "find-
217. Proposed Rule 27.26(h), 618 S.W.2d at 659 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
218. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(e). For a comparison of the numbers of cases dis-
posed of with and without hearings in circuit court, see note 55 supra. Under a 1967
United States Supreme Court decision involving a direct appeal, an appointed
lawyer may, in effect, recommend to the court that no hearing be granted. Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). After "conscientious examination" of the
case, the lawyer may inform the court that he considers it "frivolous." Id. But the
lawyer must also supply the court and client with a brief containing anything that
might possibly support the appeal. The Court added that "such handling would
tend to protect counsel from the constantly increasing charge that he was ineffec-
tive." Id. at 745.
219. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(e); proposed Rule 27.26(h), 618 S.W.2d at 659
(Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
220. Mo. SUl). CT. R. 27.26(g); proposed Rule 27.26(j), 618 S.W.2d at 660
(Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
221. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(h); proposed Rule 27.26(e), 618 S.W.2d at 659
(Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
222. Proposed Rule 27.26(e), 618 S.W.2d at 659 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
223. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
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ings of fact and conclusions of law" on every issue presented, but the pro-
posed rule specifically requires findings to be written. 225
A "clearly erroneous" standard of review is to be used on appeal under
both rules, 226 but the procedures for appeal are quite different. Under the
current rule, Rule 27.26 appeals are separate procedures, and the civil ap-
peal procedure established under Missouri Revised Statutes section
512.020227 is followed. The Donnelly proposal, on the other hand, would
consolidate Rule 27.26 appeals with direct appeals. Upon the filing of a Rule
27.26 motion, the movant would be granted a stay of delivery into custody
of the Department of Corrections. Filing of the motion would waive the mov-
ant's right to appellate review until the issues in the Rule 27.26 motion were
decided and would extend the deadline for filing a notice of direct appeal
until after the trial court's final determination on the Rule 27.26 motion.
After a ruling on the motion, the defendant would have ten days to appeal
the court's ruling on the motion, the court'sjudgment of conviction, or both,
by filing a single notice of appeal. 228
For those sentenced after a guilty plea, ChiefJustice Donnelly proposes
a separate Rule 27.27, Roughly eighty-five percent of Missouri's prisoners
are incarcerated after sentencing subsequent to guilty pleas. 229 Proposed Rule
27.27 tightens postconviction procedures for those who plead guilty.
Although the proposed rule does not establish a deadline by which Rule 27.27
225. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(i); proposed Rule 27.26(k), 618 S.W.2d at 660
(Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
226. MO. SuP. CT. R. 27.26(j); proposed Rule 27.26(1), 618 S.W.2d at 660
(Donnelly, C.J., dissenting). Provisions for providing indigents with transcripts
are similar. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.26(k); proposed Rule 27.26(m), 618 S.W.2d at 660
(Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
227. (Cum. Supp. 1982). See MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.260).
228. Proposed Rule 27.26(1), 618 S.W.2d at 660 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
The American Bar Association Standards have been revised to encompass unitary
review such as that proposed by Chief Justice Donnelly:
When an application for postconviction relief is filed before the time for
appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence has lapsed, the trial
court should have the power to extend the time for taking such appeal un-
til the conclusion of the postconviction proceeding. When an application
for postconviction relief is filed while an appeal from the judgment of con-
viction and sentence is pending, the appellate court should have the power
to suspend the appeal until the conclusion of the postconviction proceeding
or to transfer- the postconviction proceeding to the appellate court im-
mediately. The trial court or appellate court should exercise these powers
to enable simultaneous consideration of the appeal, if taken, from the judg-
ment of conviction and sentence and an appeal, if taken, from the judgment
in the postconviction proceeding, where joinder of appeals would con-
tribute to orderly administration of criminal justice.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 22-2.2(a).
229. See note 202 supra.
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motions must be filed, 230 it would require leave of the sentencing court to
even file a motion. Discretion would be vested in the sentencing court to
grant leave if it believes that there has been a significant retrospective change
in the substantive or procedural law applied in the movant's case or that
there has been a "miscarriage ofjustice. "231 Upon a grant of leave, the court
would schedule a hearing date no more than fifteen days later.232 If the mo-
tion is denied after hearing, there would be no right to appeal unless the court
that would hear the appeal issued a "certificate of probable cause."
233
Proposed Rules 27.26 and 27.27 both provide that the appointed counsel
who represented an indigent before sentencing will represent him on the
postconviction motion "unless relieved by order of court. "234 Proposed Rule
27.26 adds, "Counsel shall be relieved if ineffectiveness of counsel at trial
is alleged." ' 235 Proposed Rule 27.27, however, does not mention relieving
counsel when ineffectiveness at the time of the guilty plea is alleged. This
omission is deliberate.2 36
ChiefJustice Donnelly proposed his new rules with some modesty. In
his words, "No one knows the magic formula." 23 7 Some elements of his pro-
posal are undesirable. The rigid, twenty-day maximum time limit for filing
a Rule 27.26 motion imposed on movants convicted at trial seems unwork-
able. Many grounds for Rule 27.26 relief, such as use of perjured testimony
by the state or ineffective assistance of counsel, might not be discovered within
twenty days. Such a rigid time limitation means some state prisoners could
not get effective relief in Missouri courts. Under the Donnelly plan, prisoners
with claims arising under the laws or constitution of the United States could
not be heard under Rule 27.26, which would be limited to state claims. With
state remedies exhausted, prisoners could have their petitions heard in federal
court, and no Missouri court would have a chance to review state procedures.
230. Proposed Rule 27.26(b), 618 S.W.2d at 661 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
231. Proposed Rule 27.27(d), 618 S.W.2d at 661 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
The grounds for gaining leave of court to file a Rule 27.27 motion after a guilty
plea are the same grounds that a person convicted after trial may use under pro-
posed Rule 27.26 in order to file an "untimely or successive" Rule 27.26 motion.
From denial of such leave under proposed Rule 27.26, there is no appeal unless
the court which would hear the appeal issues a "certificate of probable cause." Pro-
posed Rule 27.26(n), 618 S.W.2d at 660-61 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting). Proposed
Rule 27.27 on successive motions is brief. It provides simply that, "The circuit court
shall not entertain successive motions." Proposed Rule 27.27(m), 618 S.W.2d at
662 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
232. Proposed Rule 27.27(e), 618 S.W.2d at 661 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
233. Proposed Rule 27.27(k), 618 S.W.2d at 662 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
234. Proposed Rules 27.26(e), 27.27(i), 618 S.W.2d at 659, 661-62 (Donnelly,
C.J., dissenting).
235. Proposed Rule 27.26(e), 618 S.W.2d at 659 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting).
236. Interview with ChiefJustice Donnelly, supra note 87. The reason for that
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Perhaps this is what the chiefjustice wants. It is consistent with the attitude
that, if federal courts are going to rehear postconviction cases anyway, they
may as well hear them sooner instead of later, sparing the state time and
expense and reaching finality more quickly.
Chief Justice Donnelly's proposal seems internally inconsistent in its
twenty-day statute of limitations for filing Rule 27.26 motions, for that limit
only applies to movants convicted at trial. Movants who plead guilty have
no such time limitation. That distinction does not seem warranted, for it
may be just as difficult to learn of constitutionally significant circumstances
affecting a trial as those affecting the validity of a guilty plea. Indeed, the
circumstances could be precisely the same. The proposal's provision of a
change of counsel for the movant if ineffective assistance of counsel at trial
is claimed, while deliberately omitting that provision for movants who plead
guilty, is also not warranted.
On the positive side, ChiefJustice Donnelly's provision for consolidating
direct appeals with postconviction proceedings is well worth consideration
by the Missouri Supreme Court. The commentary of the American Bar
Association on unitary review is favorable. 238 Decisions on the postconvic-
tion motion may make an appeal unnecessary, or, if an appeal is still war-
ranted, consolidation of the appeal on the motion and the direct appeal may
give the appellate court a better perspective on the case as a whole. Con-
solidation of appeals also saves time, energy, and expense for courts and
attorneys. Consolidation would be a net gain. As a more efficient system
contributes to earlier finality of convictions, the idea of consolidation, where
possible, of postconviction proceedings and direct appeals is one that may
well deserve implementation.
While Chief Justice Donnelly's plan is neither workable nor desirable
in its entirety, it does address the very real problem of the timing of postcon-
viction review.
C. Miscellaneous Proposals
Several other formulas for solving, or at least ameliorating, problems
created by Rule 27.26 have been proposed. The major problem with ap-
pointment of counsel for all indigent Rule 27.26 movants is financial; there
is not enough money to adequately pay counsel.2 39 Financing has been a
major problem in the whole area of indigent defense, and appointing counsel
for all Rule 27.26 movants has increased the costs. State AuditorJames An-
tonio has suggested tightening the procedure for determining indigency, pur-
suing greater recoupment of state funds spent for state-paid attorneys, and
increasing court fees in all cases. Antonio says that "each additional $1 of
court costs imposed per case apparently would generate at least $350,000
to $400,000 annually.'240 Against this proposal, it is argued that requiring
238. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 22-2.2 Commentary.
239. Interview with Kristie Green, supra note 53.
240. Auditor's Report, supra note 41, at 38.
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civil litigants to help defray the costs of providing defense attorneys in criminal
cases is unfair. 24 1 While Rule 27.26 cases are civil, they result from criminal
litigation.
The American Bar Association suggests another method for reducing
the cost of postconviction relief-deterring frivolous claims by recovering
court costs from petitioners who persist with claims for postconviction relief
after legal advice to the contrary.
242
State Senator Ralph Uthlaut has proposed reducing prisoner travel by
holding postconviction hearings, at the discretion of the judge, at the
prison. 24 3 Presently, prisoners return for hearings to their sentencing courts.
This proposal would cut down on travel expenses of prisoners but would
entail travel time for judges. Uthlaut believes that his proposal would
eliminate some of the nuisance motions from prisoners who merely want
a change of scenery or a chance to escape. 244
Terry Daley, a former public defender, has proposed a variation of
Uthlaut's plan-holding postconviction hearings in the circuit court nearest
the prisoner's correctional institution. She also proposed that the public
defender nearest the correctional institution assist in preparing Rule 27.26
motions. This would cut down on travel costs and communication problems
for counsel, as well as the costs of inmates' travel and incarceration. Daley
notes that "the attractive trips away from the penitentiary would be
limited." 24 15 Trips are lengthy in some cases, as the prisoner may be in-
carcerated hundreds of miles from the site of his criminal prosecution. Fur-
241. Hearings, supra note 1, at 68 (Kansas City, Mo. Sept. 23, 1981) (testimony
of Circuit Judge Peters). Howard Eisenberg, Executive Director of the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association, says that an effort to adopt assessment of a
"surcharge or suit tax" in civil cases to pay for representation of indigents in both
civil and criminal cases is being made now in "a number of states." Eisenberg,
supra note 136, at 26.
242. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 22-4.3 Commentary. Elsewhere the
Standards say, "The power to assess costs and expenses should be used sparingly
and with discretion so as not to deter applicants with litigable claims. Assessment
is appropriate when it appears that an applicant, having had access to competent
legal advice, pursued a claim that wholly lacked basis in law or factual support."
Id. § 22-4.7(a)(iii). Missouri inmates may have income from which to pay assessed
costs from, for instance, the prison industries and farm program. MISSOURI DIVI-
SION OF CORRECTIONS, BIENNIAL REPORT 17-21 (1978-1980). An inmate who
totally lacked funds would seem undeterred by this provision.
243. See H.R.223, 81st Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (1981). H.R. 223 provides:
1. When a person committed to the Division of Corrections is a defen-
dant at a preliminary hearing, or pretrial or postrial motion or proceeding,
or the movant in a post-conviction proceeding, such proceeding may in
the discretion of the judge be heard within a facility of the Division of
Corrections.
2. Jury trials shall not be heard within a facility of the Division of
Corrections.
244. Telephone interview with Senator Ralph Uthlaut (Oct. 1, 1981).
245. Daley, supra note 35, at 45.
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RULE 27.26
ther, this plan would allow courts and public defenders near correctional
institutions to develop special expertise in handling postconviction matters.24r
Neither Uthlaut's nor Daley's proposal provides for postconviction hear-
ings at the sentencing court. 247 There are several advantages to holding
hearings at the sentencing court. First, witnesses are more likely to be near
the sentencing forum than the incarceration site. Second, the sentencing
judge is familiar with the case and may be in a position to make a better
and more expeditious ruling on a Rule 27.26 motion. Third, the judge would
have the opportunity to rectify constitutional infirmities that occurred either
at the trial over which he presided or in the guilty plea he accepted.
Daley's plan could be modified by holding the Rule 27.26 hearing at
the sentencing court while still assigning to the indigent movant the public
defender nearest the site of incarceration. Although potential movants would
have the incentive of a trip home to spur frivolous claims, the public defenders
nearest correctional institutions, who have developed special expertise in
Rule 27.26 cases through heavy exposure, could help screen out
unmeritorious claims. With the flexibility of the new public defender system,
an additional assistant public defender could be hired in a particular area-
Cole County, for example, the site of Missouri's largest prison248 -if the,
volume of Rule 27.26 cases so warranted. In cases disposed of without a hear-
ing, relatively little travel time or cost would be created and initial com-
munication with the prisoner would be facilitated. Copies of records from
the sentencing court could be forwarded to the public defender assigned to
the case. If investigation of witnesses at the sentencing site were needed, the
assigned public defender perhaps could contact the public defender from
the sentencing site or that defender's investigator. 249 In cases requiring a
hearing, no excess travel time or cost would be created for the public defender
system as a whole. There would be no sigfiificant difference between the
public defender nearest the prison traveling to the sentencing court for the
hearing and the public defender nearest the county court traveling to the
correctional institution to visit the inmate prior to the hearing. A public
defender probably would need to travel to the prison at least once in order
to prepare adequately. The increase in efficiency and quality that could result
from having only a very few public defender offices handle all Rule 27.26
cases merits consideration. 250
246. Id. at 44-45.
247. The American Bar Association Standards, which originally called for a
single, state-wide court to handle postconviction cases, now favors having hearings
held at the site of the original criminal proceedings. ABA STANDARDS, supra note
22, §§ 22-1.4, 22-4, 22-5.
248. In 1982, the Missouri State Penitentiary had a population of over 2000
inmates. Missouri Executive Budget § 9-7 (1983). Total prison population that year
was approximately 5423. See note 56 supra.
249. Under the 1982 legislation, public defenders may have investigators. See
note 140 supra.
250. An additional effect of having the public defender nearest a correctional
institution represent a movant whose home is distant might appear in ineffective
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VII. CONCLUSION
While accepting ChiefJustice Donnelly's view that "no magic formula"
exists for postconviction relief, the following suggestions, it is hoped, would
improve postconviction procedures:
First. The new public defender legislation should have a one-sentence
addition to section 600.042.3 to authorize use of that system to represent
indigent Rule 27.26 movants. This would help ensure quality, cost-effective
representation for them. It also would make the legislation consistent with
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26(h), which mandates appointment of
counsel to represent indigent movants. Rule 27.26(h) also should be modified
by the Missouri Supreme Court to reflect the change from a court-appointed
counsel system to one in which all state-paid attorneys are either public
defenders or attorneys with whom the public defender system contracts.
Second. The public defender office nearest the prison where the movant
is incarcerated should represent him. Concentrating the bulk of Rule 27.26
work on a few public defenders would further increase their expertise in
handling postconviction cases. With this expertise, they could both help
screen out nonmeritorious Rule 27.26 claims and provide experienced
representation for meritorious ones.
Third. Rule 27.26 should be revised to allow consolidation of direct ap-
peals and Rule 27.26 appeals, where possible. This unitary review would
save time, money, and energy.
These modifications are aimed at improving postconviction procedures;
they will not produce a flawless system. Even under the best of circumstances,
man-made systems are not perfect. When dealing with prisoners seeking
freedom, the circumstances are far from the best. There will always be some
abuse of the postconviction system, for persons using it have little to lose.
Yet postconviction review must be provided to ensure that abuse has not
occurred in another less-than-perfect system-the criminal justice system.
The question then is how to design the best postconviction relief system, one
that operates efficiently and creates the fewest problems of its own.
In the past, Missouri has experienced the problems created by pro se
motions for postconviction relief and by conscripted attorneys-unpaid or
underpaid-representing Rule 27.26 movants. Missouri now has the
framework for improving the representation of movants in its new public
defender system. By adopting the steps outlined above, Missouri's postcon-
viction relief system could provide quality representation for all Rule 27.26
movants in the most cost-effective manner.
SANDRA DAVIDSON SCOTT
assistance of counsel cases-it might be easier psychologically for the public defender
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